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ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the effects of atmospheric nuclear weapons tests conducted at the Nevada
Test Site from 1951-1962 on Washington County, Utah, specifically focusing on the effects of
these detonations on the local population, the local flora and fauna, and the ensuing impact of
political and economic forces. While some Americans readily concede that these tests were
necessary for the survival of the United States in the face of Soviet nuclear aggression, other
Americans (notably, those who were most closely affected) do not share such a patriotic view of
the government’s conduct in performing such extensive and damaging experiments. Therefore,
the historical philosophy behind the compulsion to treat the deserts of the American Southwest
(and the populations that inhabit them and the surrounding areas) as expendable resources,
valuable only insofar as they serve economic, militaristic, or propagandistic purposes for the
Federal government is examined.

INDEX WORDS: Nevada Test Site, Atomic Energy Commission, Downwinders, Operation
Divine Strake, Radioactive Fallout, Iodine 131, Cesium 137, Manhattan Project, Atomic Energy
Act, Uranium Mining

1

THE BOMBS BURSTING IN AIR: A HISTORY OF THE EFFECTS OF ATMOSPHERIC
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING ON WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH, 1951-1963
by
PAUL W. BRIDGES II

B.A., Georgia Southern University, 2007
A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Georgia Southern University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
MASTER OF ARTS
STATESBORO, GEORGIA
2014

2

© 2014
PAUL W. BRIDGES II
All Rights Reserved

3

THE BOMBS BURSTING IN AIR: A HISTORY OF THE EFFECTS OF ATMOSPHERIC
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING ON WASHINGTON COUNTY, UTAH, 1951-1963
by
PAUL W. BRIDGES II

Major Professor:
Committee:

Alan C. Downs
William Allison
Cathy Skidmore-Hess

Electronic Version Approved:
Spring 2014

4

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A great number of amazing people have assisted in the process of researching and writing
this project, and while I may have neglected to mention each of their names, their many
contributions cannot be overstated.
I owe an enormous debt of gratitude to Dr. Alan Downs, who helped to cultivate a love
for the history of the American West and was a mentor in both my educational pursuits and life’s
crises. He always encouraged my unconventional viewpoints, even when he may have
disagreed, and while he may have had doubts about whether I would finish this project, never
gave up on me.
Friends and loved ones who listened to my ranting and raving, assisted in researching and
editing, and never doubted and kept pushing me forward, even in dark times, include Carlyn
Pinkins, Lance Farman, Megan Taylor, Rebecca Miller, Keith Kelley, Brian Penrow, and Drew
Daley. A special and enormous thanks goes to Jeffrey and Bonnie Allen, who opened their
Washington County home to me and always provided love and shelter from life’s storms.
The staffs of the Zach S. Henderson Library at Georgia Southern University, the J.
Willard Mariott Library’s Special Collections department at the University of Utah (especially
Lorraine Crouse and Betsey Stout), and the Utah State Historical Society Archives and History
Research Center in Salt Lake City provided invaluable guidance and patience in helping me to
locate the source materials necessary to compile the evidence for my argument. Also, Andrew
Kishner, founder of NuclearCrimes.org, was kind enough to help me locate research critical to
this study.
I received guidance and encouragement from the entire faculty and staff at the Georgia
Southern Department of History during my time there, and will always consider the Forest Drive

5

Building my Delphic Oracle. Drs. Chuck Thomas and Craig Roell, as well as my Department of
Literature and Philosophy advisor, Ryan T. Drake, provided me with both mentorship and
friendship that helped me to believe that I possessed the skills necessary to succeed
academically.
The Georgia Southern University College of Graduate Studies provided financial
assistance in funding research and travel expenses associated with this project in the form of a
research and travel grant.
Finally, I owe thanks to my parents, Paul and Lauri, whose wise mentorship and unfailing
love during my life have led to my ever-present state of becoming.

6

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...............................................................................................................5
PREFACE........................................................................................................................................8
1 “WESTERN SKIES AND THREATENING CLOUDS”..........................................................13
2 “PATRIOTIC POPULACE: WASHINGTON COUNTY RESIDENTS AND THE COLD
WAR”................................................................................................................................33
3 “THE UNSEEN ENEMY: FARMING PRACTICES, RADIATION, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT”.......................................................................................52
4 “POLITICAL FALLOUT: THE DOWNWINDERS, AEC DUPLICITY, AND
CONGRESSIONAL FAILURE”.......................................................................................74
5 “SILENCE DOWNWIND: THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESTRUCTIVE LAND USE,
FEDERAL LARGESSE, AND PUBLIC ACQUIESENCE”..........................................107
CONCLUSION: “LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF THE BOMBS”.........................................124
BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................131

7

PREFACE

This project developed out of a paper I wrote for an undergraduate seminar course on the
U. S. West. The original idea for the work was a general examination of how the United States’
atomic weapons program embodied historical themes associated with the U. S. West. After
receiving some literature regarding public outcry about a scheduled weapons experiment at the
Nevada Test Site from a friend residing in the hamlet of Rockville, Utah, I began doing more
extensive research into the experiences of people in downwind communities during the
atmospheric testing period. The following summer of 2007, I visited Rockville, which is located
in Washington County, Utah, and developed a personal connection with the area and its people.
The paper I wrote led me to many more questions than answers, and the time I spent there that
summer convinced me that I should continue to pursue the topic.
In a way, I am also now a downwinder, as I have had this metaphorical radioactive cloud
of a research project hovering over my life for the last seven years. While the research phase of
the process was exhilarating, I found the daunting challenge of composing the finished product
to be depressing, frustrating, and frightening. Many changes occurred over that span, and life’s
challenges have a way of clarifying one’s purpose, even if not making the path less strenuous. I
lived the majority of the first quarter century of my existence within forty miles of a nuclear
power plant. My father worked as a contract administrator at the Edwin I. Hatch nuclear plant
for twenty-two years, from the time I was five years old, so I grew up with nuclear power as an
unquestioned fact of life. It was not until the winter of 2006 that I began to question the tenets
and origins of nuclear technology, and perhaps the disillusionment of the realizations that
followed unavoidably tainted my project. Still, I found Washington County’s role in the
development of a national nuclear program to be compelling.
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During the course of my research, I realized that there was no precedent for the manner in
which I intended to tell the story, no framework which had already been built by secondary
scholars. While several scholars from the fields of history, political science, journalism, and
sociology have examined the topic from the perspectives of their chosen disciplines, no
historians had dealt with the subject from the point of view of a specific community. Therefore,
I chose Washington County, Utah, as the location upon which to center my focus.
In his 1986 book, Justice Downwind, Howard Ball approached the subject from an
epidemiologic point of view and told the story from information revealed in the downwinders’
landmark court case, Irene Allen et al. v. United States. Ball, then a political science professor
specializing in civil rights, constitutional law, and the judicial process, cursorily dealt with St.
George, but did not discuss any communities in Washington County. He examined the
development of the nuclear weapons complex and the Atomic Energy Commission’s (AEC)
association with national security, the responses of downwinders and their cancer incidence, the
medical controversy in linking radioactive fallout and cancer, and the progression and impact of
the Allen trial. Ball concluded that the government had violated the civil rights of downwinders
and that the judge’s decision in the Allen trial was the first step in setting right the injuries they
had suffered.
The same year, Constandina Titus, a political science professor at UNLV, former Nevada
state senator, and current Nevada congresswoman in the U. S. House of Representatives,
published Bombs in the Backyard in which she related the nuclear testing program to the
overarching American political scene. Titus, who also worked with the National Atomic Testing
Museum located in Las Vegas, Nevada, attempted to make the case that the AEC did not deceive
the public through various public relations campaigns, but merely argued effectively that
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experimenting with nuclear weapons on American soil was necessary even if the possibility of
endangering public health was a consequence. Titus dealt only cursorily with subjects from
Washington County, choosing instead to focus primarily on the southern Nevada region in
relation to the testing program. While she did acknowledge the economic benefits to southern
Nevada from the testing program, Titus ultimately found that the government conducted its
nuclear experiments as a result of the existential threat posed by the U.S.S.R.
A few years later, after the federal government had made its judicial appeals, Philip L.
Fradkin released Fallout: An American Nuclear Tragedy. Fradkin was a journalist who covered
the Vietnam War and environmental issues for several publications including the Los Angeles
Times, and also served as editor for Audubon magazine and taught writing at Stanford University
and the University of California, Berkeley. Fradkin utilized the Allen trial as the framework for
his telling of the story and covered issues related to the involved governmental agencies, legal
defense and prosecution teams, the testing facility, individual test shots, victims, nuclear
scientists, and Judge Jenkins’ decision in the Allen trial. He concluded that an appeals court’s
decision to overturn Jenkins’ decision was yet another injustice the federal government delivered
upon the downwinders.
In the early 1990s, Barton C. Hacker published the second of two volumes in which he
examined the history and progress of the AEC’s radiological safety program, from its inception
in 1946 through its dissolution in 1975. Reynolds Electrical and Engineering Company, a prime
contractor of the U. S. Department of Energy’s Nevada Operations Office, had contracted
Hacker in 1978 to work on this project. By 1992, Hacker had accepted the position of Lab
Historian for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory at the University of California,
Livermore. Hacker attempted to tell the story of the effects of the radiological safety efforts of
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the nuclear weapons testing program from both the perspective of scientists and downwinders.
Hacker described the efforts he exerted in order to remain dispassionate and objective about his
subject matter, and he achieved his goal in this work. Hacker was thorough in describing the
fallout accidents during the Simon and Harry Shots of 1953, but his treatment of Washington
County was also very limited.
Environmental sociologist Valerie Kuletz published The Tainted Desert: Environmental
and Social Ruin in the American West in 1998, in which she examined the social and
environmental impacts of what she termed “nuclearism.” The daughter of a nuclear weapons
scientist who studied at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Kuletz dealt with the social and
environmental costs in the desert West from the 1940s through the 1990s, focusing her work on
the dichotomy between sacred homeland and sacrificial wasteland. She took into account the
perspectives of Native Americans, antinuclear activists, scientists, and government officials, and,
while she dealt with the problems associated with downwinders, she addressed them as a group
and did not specifically focus on any particular area. Kuletz concluded that radiation
contamination continues to pose a threat to humans because of water issues, and that in order to
address the threat of radiation contamination humans must address their increasing alienation
from nature.
Charles Loeber’s 2002 work, Building the Bombs: A History of the Nuclear Weapons
Complex, is a history of the origins and development of the various programs and offices which
comprise the cumulative atomic weapons production and testing apparatus. Loeber, a former
employee of the DOE Albuquerque Operations Office and Sandia National Laboratories,
composed this book in response to requests for the materials he used during presentations he
gave at the Albuquerque Operations Office of the history and missions of the nuclear weapons
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complex. He began with a review of Albert Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity and brought
the story up to the current challenges of the new millennium in maintaining stockpiles and
appropriate nuclear deterrents. It is a work of general history, and Loeber did not give much
attention to the Nevada Test Site and only a passing reference in his epilogue to the experiences
of downwind residents.
I have felt that I was on a ledge with this project from the moment I realized the
immensity of the subject with which I intended to grapple, with no framework for writing a
proper history that would do justice to both the topic and the people affected. I felt compelled to
tell the story of the people who were at greatest risk of injury, and to try to understand how a
community of individuals who felt they were authoring their own destinies could resign itself to
the whims of ambitious politicians and scientists. I had originally intended to build the story by
researching three aspects of Washington County: social structure, environment, and politics.
After gathering sources and evidence, especially from the Washington County News, I realized
that these Washingtonians had an economic motivation and were extremely patriotic, two
important facets of the story which I had initially overlooked. The work that follows is my
attempt to tell a complex and heart-wrenching story and to capture the spirit of the people of
Washington County who lived in the shadow of the atomic weapons experiments at NTS.
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WESTERN SKIES AND THREATENING CLOUDS
“Even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating
retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives
that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.... Let no one think that the expenditure of vast
sums for weapons and systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens
of any nation.”—Dwight David Eisenhower1
During the period of the United States’ atmospheric nuclear weapons tests, 1951-1963,
radioactive by-products rained down on communities across the entire country. This period
coincided with the onset of the Cold War, in which the American people believed that
experimentation with nuclear devices would help to deter an attack on their homeland by the
United Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). This radioactive fallout, while heaviest and most
dangerous in areas near the testing sites, created potentially serious health consequences for all
living beings that came into contact with it. However, the communities located within a few
hundred miles of the testing sites were in the most danger from radioactive contamination.
Washington County, Utah, was one such community that was hit particularly hard with
radioactive fallout. Its population, predominantly members of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints (LDS), was extremely patriotic in its support of America’s position during the
Cold War. Primarily due to the limited public understanding of the effects of radiation, there
was little concern for short-term, localized effects or the long-term, environmental effects of
radiation contamination. Also contributing to the lack of public awareness was a concerted
effort on the part of government officials to convince the American people, especially those
living in the nearby vicinity of the testing program, that the weapons tests were crucial to
thwarting an impending Soviet attack. Finally, the prevailing economic philosophy that land
must in some way prove to be economically beneficial, as well as the fact that large amounts of
1

Presidential Address Document no. 256, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D.
Eisenhower, 1953-1960 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1960). Address Before the United Nations
General Assembly, December 8, 1953, p. 816. Hereafter cited as Eisenhower, Papers.
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federal funds flowed into the area as a result of ongoing Cold War military-industrial expansion,
meant that very few people thought to question the practice of testing nuclear weapons in
Americans’ backyards.
In many ways, the experiences of Washington County residents with radioactive fallout
from nuclear weapons tests typify the historical experiences of people living in the American
West. The people who lived in this area during the period of atmospheric nuclear weapons
testing, like those Americans who had sought out the western frontier as a refuge a century
earlier, faced unknown and unforeseen dangers; boom and bust mining, agriculture, and
commercial enterprises; exploitation of the West’s people and resources for large corporations in
the eastern states; the presence of military personnel and installations; an influx of federal dollars
intended to expand the profitability of the region’s business ventures; and an increasing trend of
rural western populations to urbanize. Ultimately, however, the conquest of an apparently
inhospitable land for national and economic gain is the western historical theme that figures most
heavily in the history of the United States’ nuclear weapons testing period.2
For many Americans, the mention of the “American West” calls up fantastical images of
noble cowboys, savage Indians, and a vast, untamed wilderness. This is the result of an idealized
mental picture of the “Old West” which can be largely attributed to the focus placed on this
timeless locale by Hollywood’s motion pictures. But the American West is more than just the
Old West that is dead and gone; it is also the Contemporary West, a dynamic place without
explicitly defined spatial boundaries and which acts upon the inhabitants as much as they act
upon it. The true, complex nature of the contemporary American West serves to propagate the
2

For a more detailed exegesis of the themes which historians associate with America’s Western frontier, see
Richard Etulain, Beyond the Missouri: The Story of the American West, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 2006; Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West, New
York and London: W.W. Norton, 2006 (1987); and William Cronon, George Miles, and Jay Gitlin, eds., Under an
Open Sky: Rethinking America’s Western Past, New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1992.
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idea that Hollywood’s images are accurate; it is easier to simplify wrongly a complex situation
than to work through the complexities. Yet, these perceptions do not seem to be wholly
inaccurate. The concept of an untamed wilderness is true to a large extent, if one takes into
account lands owned by the federal government, federally protected nature preserves, and
restricted-access military installations. The truth, which is not told by the pretty pictures of a
pristine wilderness painted either by Hollywood or the tourism advertisements of the National
Park Service, is that the landscape has been, and still is, under attack.
The seemingly barren regions of desert that comprise much of the states of Arizona,
California, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah are homes to numerous military installations. These
installations serve various functions, from U.S. Air Force bombing ranges to U.S. Department of
Energy research laboratories, nuclear weapons detonation/waste disposal sites, and even a naval
weapons center in the middle of the Mojave Desert. Several share at least one border with a
National Wildlife Refuge (NWR): the White Sands Missile Range and Fort Bliss Military
Reserve in New Mexico completely surround the San Andreas NWR and the White Sands
National Monument, and the Nevada Test Site and Nellis Air Force Range adjoin the Desert
National Wildlife Range in Nevada. Most of these sites have been labeled as “No Public
Access” areas, and six of the bases in Nevada are simply designated as “Restricted Military
Areas.” Officials considered deserts to be perfect locations for these installations, as there tends
to be relatively few inhabitants and very little traffic in the surrounding areas. Furthermore, the
desert provides for easily-observable, strategically-defensible borders. As a region that is too
foreboding for many humans to inhabit, and which serves the interests of a federal government
that is seemingly in need of such military installations, the barren deserts of the American West
do, in fact, offer some utility to Americans.
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In keeping with the tradition of Old West boomtowns, the U.S. government, on all levels,
has treated the deserts of the American West as expendable resources, useful only insofar as they
can be exploited for the economic needs or desires of American society. But, whereas people
were able to re-inhabit the abandoned mining towns long after the profiteers had moved on to
richer veins, it will be a very long time before the western deserts will be rid of the effects of the
testing projects conducted there during the last sixty years. The conditions under which it
became necessary to adopt this policy of environmental negligence were created during the
Second World War. It was during this period that all facets of American society and resources
were drawn upon, and not even the desert wastelands were spared a part in the war.
Prior to World War II, the U.S. West remained an industrially and economically
underdeveloped region, completely dependent on the East for all financially viable activity, as it
had served as a supplier of raw materials which were refined and manufactured into goods in
Eastern industrial hubs.3 There had been no need to develop a large industrial base in the West,
since the railroad had been built to make transportation of those raw materials to the East much
easier. Furthermore, there was no labor base in the American West: as of the 1940 census, the
West accounted for half of the nation’s land area, but less than fifteen percent of the total
population.4 However, when the U.S. began to mobilize for war in 1941, the West began to
receive large portions of the federal funds appropriated for the production of agricultural,
industrial, and military goods. With much of the country still feeling the effects of the Great
Depression, people followed the money.
In particular, funds appropriated for the military led to the creation and development of
manufacturing and industrial assembly plants across much of the West. As well, the needs of the
3

Gerald D. Nash, The American West Transformed: The Impact of the Second World War, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1985, p. 14.
4
Ibid., p. 10.
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military and the availability of inexpensive land helped to create an atmosphere which was
conducive to the new aerospace and electronics industries. With the federal government
spending large amounts of money to finance the capital required to produce the American war
machine, these plants provided a multitude of new jobs in the western U.S. alone. This spurred a
new westward migration of people still trying to recover from the effects of the Depression, and
this new population provided the workforce for the blossoming production industries, as well as
the tertiary support service industry which emerged in order to meet the demand for emerging
community and cultural services.5
The economic impact of the $70 billion allocated by Congress from 1941-1945 for
western development was critical to the war in the Pacific.6 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
believed that the West had a great potential to provide support for the Allied forces in the Pacific,
and he made sure that funding was adequate to actualize that potential.7 Those states which
lacked the necessary conditions to support large urban populations (and, therefore, industry) or
agricultural lands were not deprived of these funds. Rather, the federal government spent a large
portion of that money to establish military “training camps, air bases, testing facilities and
storage depots” which transformed the West into the primary locale for the ever-expanding
military-industrial complex.8
The major factor for this development, the great potential which Roosevelt saw, was the
impression of a barren region. While it would be erroneous to believe that these places were
completely devoid of humans, such a relatively uninhabited region did not exist in the eastern
half of the country. In the West, large amounts of land in remote locations could accommodate

5

Ibid., pp. 17-18.
Ibid., p. 19.
7
Etulain, Beyond the Missouri, p. 363.
8
Nash, American West Transformed, p. 24.
6
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large increases in populations. Furthermore, the federal government remained the sole proprietor
of most of the West. The desert wastelands, while extremely unattractive to immigrants, offered
an isolation which federal and scientific administrators coveted for experiments involving
technological advancements requiring immense stretches of unoccupied land.9 Considering the
defense capability in the area, it made sense to establish the most sensitive of the nation’s new
scientific research facilities in close proximity to these military installations. But, it also meant
that the federal government, along with the U.S. military, would establish a connection with the
scientific community which it intended to exploit.
The most important of the military’s wartime scientific endeavors was the Manhattan
Engineer District, also known as the Manhattan Project. In 1939, physicists Albert Einstein and
Leo Szilard sent a letter to Roosevelt warning of the likelihood that Germany was working
toward the construction of a new military weapon capable of harnessing the power of the newly
hypothesized theory of fission. Einstein and Szilard proposed that the government begin a
search to find private investors to fund a similar venture in America.10 Roosevelt responded
within two months that he had called together a group of officials in order to explore the
prospects of building and properly funding such a weapon.11 However, it was not until the
summer of 1941 that President Roosevelt authorized Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, to begin research and development of the project. Private
investors did not fund the project; the federal government tightly controlled the operation. The
Manhattan Project officially became a federal program when government officials called upon

9

Ibid., pp. 18-9.
“Einstein’s Letter to Roosevelt,” in Michael B. Stoff, et al., eds, The Manhattan Project: A Documentary
Introduction to the Atomic Age, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991, pp. 18-9.
11
Ibid., p. 20.
10
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Brigadier General Leslie Richard Groves in the summer of 1942 to oversee the operation for the
War Department.12
One of the features which resulted from the urgency of this top-secret project was to
divide the operation into different jobs positioned in various parts of the country. This was done
in order to move the operation forward at a faster pace by harnessing the capital of existing
facilities and hiring corporations which could quickly build new ones. Thus, various
components of the overall project found housing in such eastern locations as Tennessee and
Illinois, and at Columbia and Princeton Universities. But the sites of more sensitive operations
were situated in the western states of Washington, Idaho, and New Mexico. It was at Los
Alamos, New Mexico, that head scientist Julius Robert Oppenheimer decided to establish the site
of the on-going experiments, as well as the location of the final assembly and testing of the first
atomic bomb. Under the leadership and hard work of Groves and Oppenheimer, the federal
government realized that isolated facilities of vital national interest were well worth the expense
of placing them in the Western desert.
With these new scientific laboratories in place and working feverishly toward their
objective, the next step, to find a suitable location at which to test the final product, began in
May 1944. The criteria for such a place were extremely specific: the location must be relatively
close to Los Alamos in order to transport the personnel and equipment; the weather must be fair
and predictable to a great degree; lands belonging to American Indians should remain untouched;
and, it was necessary that the landscape be reasonably smooth in order to provide the most
accurate data regarding blast effects and to extend the possible range of visual observations.13
Major W. A. (Lex) Stevens and Kenneth Tompkins Bainbridge reviewed the three sites that were
12

Ibid., p. 17.
Ferenc Morton Szasz, The Day the Sun Rose Twice: The Story of the Trinity Site Nuclear Explosion, July 16,
1945, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984, pp. 27.
13
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most promising, all in deserts, before selecting the area of the Jornada del Muerto (Spanish,
“Journey of Death”) in south-central New Mexico.14 It became known as the Trinity Site, and it
was here that the efforts of the massive Manhattan Project were put to the test.
On July 16, 1945, Trinity erupted in the world’s first test of a nuclear weapon. General
Groves, in a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson, stated that “the test was
successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone.”15 The explosion sent a
radioactive mushroom cloud billowing over 10,000 feet in the air before it “was sent in several
directions by the variable winds at the different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive
materials over a wide area.”16 Personnel, including doctors, were stationed in various locations
around the test site to measure the levels of radiation and assist with any mishaps. But,
according to Groves, “at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the
population.”17 In fact, officials believed that a few cattle and sheep had been the only casualties
of the experiment.18
The fact of the matter, however, is that even the scientists most closely connected with
the intricacies of the experiment were unsure of the “safe” levels of radiation. Moreover, the
military was only concerned with the well-being of the citizens insofar as it involved civilian
leaders in politics. The administration valued the project as an instrument which would help to
end a costly war and which would establish the United States as the world power; there was no
pause for concern about the possible ruination of land because federal authorities already
considered the region worthless. There was no ecological philosophy to warn that “unless we

14

Ibid., p. 28.
“Groves Memo to Stimson, July 18, 1945,” in Stoff, The Manhattan Project, p. 188.
16
Ibid., p. 189.
17
Ibid., p. 189.
18
Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in Nuclear
Weapons Testing, 1947-1974, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994, p. 4.
15
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can think of nature as being a source of value, and not a mere resource upon which we project
our interests, we will be unable to believe in the importance of limits to our technological
remaking of nature.”19 Indeed, the scientific belief in the necessity of maintaining objectivity in
research, coupled with a subordinate position to the federal government, prevented the scientific
community from imposing a moral culpability either upon themselves or upon the experiments
which they were conducting. Because the weather was an uncontrollable variable that
unavoidably affected nuclear experiments, this attitude of limited liability would prove
disastrous.
When President Harry S. Truman ordered a nuclear strike on Japan in August 1945, there
was some dissent among his top advisers as to the efficacy of dropping an experimental weapon
of uncertain devastation, with the most notable opposition emanating from future President
Dwight David Eisenhower.20 The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, although meant
primarily as instruments for averting a land invasion of Japan and bringing about a quicker
resolution to the war with Japan, were also meant to be further tests of bomb design and
capability. Scientists considered the design of the bomb to be “primitive,” although within four
short months, “it was estimated that 90,000 people had died in Hiroshima because of the effects
of one atomic bomb.”21
Many contemporaries argued that people who questioned the ethics of using the bomb to
end World War II implied that it was better to let the soldiers die than use the bomb and that
those people were generally not the ones whose lives were at stake.22 However, Joshua Reuben
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Lawrence Vogel, “Hans Jonas’s Imperative of Responsibility,” in Minding Nature: The Philosophers of Ecology,
New York and London: The Guilford Press, 1996, pp. 167-8.
20
William Lambers, Nuclear Weapons, n. p.: Lambers Publications, 2006 [2001], p. 7.
21
Jeremy Bernstein, Nuclear Weapons: What You Need to Know, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008, pp. 4-5.
22
Paul Fussell, Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays, New York: Summit Books, 1988, pp. 14-15.
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Clark, Jr., former Undersecretary of State to President Calvin Coolidge, disagreed with this
position and argued that the
bomb was the ‘crowning cruelty’, in a war that witnessed history’s greatest onslought
[sic] against civilian populations.... If we are to avoid extermination, if the world is not
to be wiped out, we must find some way to curb the fiendish ingenuity of men who have
no fear of God, man or the Devil…. I protest with all the energy I possess against this
fiendish activity, and call on our government to see that this terrible CURSE being
proposed is stopped.23
Most contemporaries disagreed with Clark’s position, and one of his critics claimed that “Clark
could see only one side of the enigma. The bomb was not a ‘Curse’, it saved millions of lives.”24
The federal government, as opposed to the scientific community, did have to be
concerned with liability and public perceptions regarding its peacetime nuclear weapons testing
program. At the end of World War II, U.S. officials believed that they had a monopoly on
atomic weapons technology that would last for approximately one decade, and it was an
advantage that they intended to exploit. The directors of the Manhattan Project determined that
the Trinity Site was not an ideal setting for a nuclear proving ground, since populations were at
risk from wind-blown, radioactive fallout.25 A search began to find a suitable location for a
nuclear testing facility; the committee assigned to the search released its findings in a report
entitled “Project Nutmeg.” The committee reported that, due to geographical and political
worries, the creation of a test site within the boundaries of the continental U.S. was impractical.
It further recommended that the facility established at the Pacific Proving Grounds (PPG) in the
Marshall Islands should be utilized unless a national emergency required the government to
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establish a “CONUS” (continental U.S.) test site. Thus, project directors decided to move further
testing operations to the newly acquired Marshall Islands in the North Pacific Ocean, where
testing recommenced in July 1946 with two detonations aimed at experimenting with the effects
of a nuclear blast on naval vessels.
Although the provisions of the bill did not take effect until January 1947, Congress
passed the Atomic Energy Act in late July 1946, which took control of atomic energy and
weapons programs from the military and placed it in the hands of the civilian Atomic Energy
Commission (AEC).26 The AEC was not created to be a part of the presidential cabinet, but to be
“an independent agency of the executive branch of the Federal Government.”27 The military was
not completely eliminated from the nuclear scene, however. The 1946 act contained a provision
for the establishment of a Military Liaison Committee, which was to be updated fully on all
aspects of the nuclear program which the committee thought concerned the military.28 This only
represented a small contingent of the military apparatus compared with the multiple agencies
later created to “help” the AEC conduct its nuclear weapons tests. In the meantime, testing
continued at the Pacific Proving Grounds.
A series of “emergency” situations surfaced beginning in the late summer of 1949 that
ultimately led to the creation of a continental test site. On September 23, 1949, President
Truman announced to the nation that the USSR had successfully detonated an atomic device,
nearly one month after the test had occurred on August 29. National newspaper headlines on
September 24 illustrated the shock to the national psyche, and the numerous follow-up articles
on the front pages also dealt with some aspect of the crisis, although they urged U.S. citizens not
26
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to be alarmed.29 While some U.S. officials attempted to bolster national confidence by stating
publicly that this was not an unexpected development, other officials openly criticized the public
relations’ handling of the situation.30 Also, there were members of Congress and Pentagon
officials, including Louis Arthur Johnson, Truman’s second Secretary of Defense, who
questioned the veracity of the reports of the Soviet achievement.31
Then, in June 1950, the United States became involved in the Korean War after the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (backed by the USSR) invaded the Republic of Korea.
U.S. officials became concerned that the war would threaten shipping lanes across the Pacific
Ocean. On July 13, 1950, AEC Chairman Gordon Evans Dean wrote the Chairman of the
Military Liaison Committee to suggest that the AEC and DOD (Department of Defense)
collaborate to find a continental test site.32 Among the possible locations under consideration,
several were located along the Atlantic seaboard. One-by-one, however, officials abandoned
these sites as possible testing locations “for one principal reason: the government did not own
the land and did not want to wait to go through the process of acquiring it.”33 On the other hand,
the federal government did own vast amounts of “barren” land in the western states, and such a
location would also mean that the test site would be in closer proximity to the Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratories, the main research facility for the federal nuclear weapons program.34
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At a meeting in December 1950, the AEC decided that a new facility should be
established in Nevada.35 Initially referred to as the Nevada Proving Ground, construction began
on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) on January 1, 1951. Located in Nye County, sixty-five miles
northwest of Las Vegas, it originally encompassed nearly 600 square miles of land and was
bordered by the U.S. Air Force gunnery range (AFGR), an additional 4,000-plus square miles.36
The site was chosen for several reasons, the foremost of which were the sparse population and
ease of acquisition; it was mostly comprised of lands already owned by the federal government;
and all additional lands were acquired either from the state or from private citizens. Prior to
1951, when construction of NTS began, the area encompassed by the installation was used for
“mining, grazing, and hunting.”37 By 1977, the combination of the Tonopah Test Range, Nellis
Air Force Range, and the Nevada Test Site military facilities comprised one of the largest
contiguous areas of land in the United States.38
Officials chose a site in Nevada despite their own admission that a location on the eastern
seaboard would be preferable to any location in the interior of the country, as “prevailing
westerly winds over any western site would blow fallout over most of the country and despite the
fact that after the Trinity test Stafford Leak Warren (Chief of Radiological Safety) had
recommended that tests not be done in locations with human habitations within a 150-mile
radius.”39 An east coast testing site would have blown potentially hazardous fallout into the
Atlantic Ocean, away from population centers. But the American West was the preferred
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location, as politicians and entrepreneurs have historically viewed the region as the most
politically feasible and economically beneficial area of the nation to sacrifice. While officials
already had experience in windblown fallout with the Trinity and Marshall Islands experiments,
they still chose to situate the CONUS in a locale which would deposit fallout on population
centers and the entire country.40
Furthermore, the political climate of the early years of the Cold War between the United
States and USSR contributed to this attitude that certain sacrifices were necessary to ensure the
survival of the western way of life, i.e., republican capitalism. Many politicians, military
officials, and influential citizens had come to believe that there existed a communist conspiracy
to participate actively in the overthrow of American supremacy in world affairs. In the early
years, politicians engaged in a concerted effort to express to the American public that the Soviet
Union posed a very serious, existential threat. It was in this context that the AEC’s nuclear
weapons testing program at the Nevada Test Site began. When operations commenced at the
NTS, the science behind nuclear fission was little more than a decade old. Yet, the enormous
destructive power unleashed by the military application of this burgeoning new science helped to
solidify Americans’ belief in an inherent cultural, intellectual, and social superiority over the
Soviets. This sense of superiority led many politicians, AEC officials, and citizens to reach
conclusions which were not supported—or, were directly refuted—by scientific evidence and
turn a blind eye to egregious violations of human rights.
Evidence from early atomic detonations pointed to the potentially devastating effects of
nuclear radiation on biological populations. Following the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings,
which are repeatedly referred to and listed as tests, a study by the Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory found that “if the bomb burst occurred relatively close to the ground, a situation
40
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which would be uneconomical from the standpoint of the destructive effect, and considerable
amounts of dirt and other debris were sucked into the radioactive cloud, the fall-out would have
to be considered as a danger.”41 Then, following the tests on the Bikini Atoll in the Marshall
Islands, research conducted jointly by the AEC and the University of Washington Applied
Fisheries Laboratory showed that food sources, flora, and fauna located on the atoll were still
radioactive, although the official assessment was that these levels did not pose an external
contamination danger to humans.42 In the face of contrary evidence, a great many officials and
politicians directly or indirectly attributed “‘scare stories’” about the dangers of radioactive
fallout to Soviet antagonists.43
Once the USSR achieved atomic capability, U.S. officials and the general public came to
understand the importance of maintaining nuclear superiority over their new nemesis. It became
imperative to increase both the size of the nuclear arsenal and to create more powerful and
efficient weapons and conveyance systems.44 As stated in the Civil Defense Administration’s
pamphlet, Personal Preparedness in the Nuclear Age, the government promoted the idea that the
best approach to dealing with the Soviet nuclear threat was to negotiate from a position of
strength, to “maintain and improve our strength on all fronts—spiritual, economic, and
military—if we are to remain free.”45 It was incumbent not only on the nuclear agency to
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maintain an effective stockpile of nuclear arms, but also on “the capability of the individual for
self-protection at home and at work—in the cities and towns and on the farms. Development of
this capability is the chief contribution you can make toward bringing about a worldwide
decision for lasting peace.”46 One contemporary who witnessed a nuclear test later wrote, “I was
extremely ignorant about what I had seen. But,... it had given me an absurd sense of
superiority.... As part of this [sense of entry into a “secret world”] I had gotten the idea that
these aboveground tests were both necessary and important.”47
When the American people elected World War II general and American hero Dwight
David Eisenhower to the presidency in the fall of 1952, they voted into office a man they
presumed would take a strong stance against Soviet nuclear aggression. But Eisenhower
ultimately called for global harmony and for atomic energy to be utilized for beneficial purposes
rather than for large-scale devastation.48 During his famous 1953 speech, “Atoms for Peace,” at
the United Nations General Assembly, Eisenhower declared that the “United States would seek
more than the mere reduction or elimination of atomic materials for military purposes. It is not
enough to take this weapon out of the hands of the soldiers. It must be put into the hands of
those who will know how to strip its military casing and adapt it to the arts of peace.”49 He even
went so far as to assert that, “We have never, we never will, propose or suggest that the Soviet
Union surrender what is rightfully theirs. We will never say that the people of Russia are an
enemy with whom we have no desire ever to deal or mingle in friendly and fruitful
relationship.”50 Despite these declarations, however, it was Eisenhower who oversaw a major
escalation of financial funding to experiment with new weapons, ultimately leading the United
46
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States to increase its nuclear arsenal immensely during his two-term presidency, and,
consequently, a parallel Soviet effort.51
Late in the atmospheric testing period, the Cold War culture, which posited the Soviet
Union as evil and the United States as the good nation destined to oppose the evil expansion of
communism to the freedom-loving peoples of the world, produced an interesting pamphlet
whose contents reveal a great deal about popular public sentiment. Entitled Manual for Survival:
How to Survive an A-Bomb Attack, this pamphlet seems to have first appeared in 1961. The
authors of the pamphlet contend that “the Russians have the power to launch an overwhelming
atomic attack on the U.S. this very minute. They can if they want to.”52 Furthermore, the
chance that they would attack was greater since “the rulers of Russia have no such respect for
human life as we do,” and the likely result of such an attack would be that “life as we know it in
America may be suspended for a while.”53 While the authors admitted that the majority of
laypersons in the United States did not fully understand the way in which nuclear physics
worked, they asserted that “[t]he caveman of many thousands of years ago feared fire, because
he did not understand it. When his ancestors learned enough about fire to use it, it became one
of the most beneficial developments in human history.”54 This message of national propaganda
posited that, if there was ever a group of people prepared to face such a situation, it must surely
be American citizens, since
Standing up to danger is nothing new to Americans. The first Americans braved the
threat of stormy seas to come to this wild and unknown country. They endured the
staggering blows of nature. They fought through the savage onslaughts of Indians. And
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they not only survived, they built a nation destined to become the ideal of every man on
Earth who yearns to call himself free.55
The patriotic population of Washington County, Utah, believed themselves to be the
natural inheritors of such stalwart determination. For the most part, they were the descendants of
Mormon pioneers, people who had been persecuted in eastern states for their religious beliefs
and who had resolutely braved the hardships of life in a harsh environment in order to establish
their own societal enclave. By the time of the establishment of the NTS, they had become a
community of people who had fully embraced the American idealism that would pervade 1950s
American life. They had adopted a “total personal commitment to Church, family, and flag.”56
These people tended to believe that, as far as nuclear testing and the USSR were concerned, the
American government and people were responsible for preventing Soviet encroachment into
territories where democracy ruled.57
Thus, when AEC and other government officials told the people of Washington County
that they had nothing to fear from small levels of radioactive fallout that began occurring with
the first atomic detonations at NTS, the population put full faith and credit in their reassurances.
Newspaper editorials from the Washington County News for the years of atmospheric testing
reveal that while the populace expressed some anxiety, fear, and paranoia regarding the nearby
tests, they conceded that the explosions conducted at NTS were essential to national security.
While no one wanted to live so close to the test facility, these people accepted it as necessary,
and believed that they could continue to lead lives without being hindered by the nuclear
experiments.58
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What neither they nor the rest of the American population understood, was that the tests
were precisely that, experiments conducted in order to study in further detail the intricacies of
nuclear physics, a field which scientists had barely begun to study. The AEC conducted tests
both “to develop and improve nuclear weapons” and to evaluate the effects of radiation on the
surrounding environment.59 At the time, many scientists believed that radiation exposure was
harmless unless a person’s exposure exceeded a certain level. Known as the Threshold Theory,
it held widespread support despite the fact that there were some studies whose foundational
evidence directly contradicted the basic premises of the theory. However, it was not until the
waning years of the atmospheric testing program that AEC officials and scientists publicly
acknowledged that exposure to low-level doses of radiation could have serious debilitative health
consequences for living organisms. Even then, they tended to downplay the degree to which
humans may be affected, and in many cases even implied that the dangers of radioactive fallout
were limited to fallout created by enemy bombs.60
However, friendly/enemy status did not limit the dangers of radioactive fallout. By 1964,
one year after the official end of the atmospheric testing period, there had been 340 announced
nuclear detonations by the U.S., USSR, France, and Great Britain. The result was that the “total
energy released has been about 511 million tons (MT) equivalent of TNT,” which would have
injected around thirty-one tons of fissionable decay material into the atmosphere by 1964.61 The
people living within 200 miles downwind of testing areas were most susceptible to the
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radioactive fallout produced by nuclear detonations. Later studies have shown that these
downwind populations were more likely to develop leukemia than their counterparts in other
areas of the nation.62 Furthermore, “the psychological effects of nuclear catastrophes may be
equally, if not more, prevalent than their physical health consequences,” since it is possible that a
persistent state of dread of contracting some form of cancer or other terminal disease may induce
certain physical maladies if these fears are “reinforced when cancers and other illnesses occur
among survivors and are attributed, rightly or wrongly, to the radiation exposure.”63
This is precisely the phenomena which residents of Washington County experienced
from 1951 to 1963, and, indeed, in the decades since the end of the atmospheric testing period.
While most residents supported the testing program and believed the AEC’s false assertions
during the testing period, there were some who, from the very beginning, questioned the validity
of the claims and the extent to which their health and the health of their relatives was
compromised as a result of radiation exposure. There still exists in Washington County a sharp
divide between those people who believe that the government falsified information and
compromised the health of local residents and those who think that the claims of downwind
radiation exposure is the result of a conspiratorial mindset among certain segments of the
population. While these differing opinions may never receive a definitive resolution, it is
indisputable that the bombs detonated in the nearby Nevada desert altered not only the landscape
and environment, but also the lives of the people of Washington County, Utah.
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PATRIOTIC POPULACE: WASHINGTON COUNTY RESIDENTS AND THE COLD WAR
“A lot of times in St. George, Cedar City, some of those small towns up in central Utah, the
teachers would take the students out to watch the blast. And we were getting the story up there
[in Salt Lake City] that it was history in the making but it’s not dangerous.... And that simply
wasn’t true and they knew it wasn’t true.... Intellectually and psychologically they probably
could not believe that the government would, on purpose, deceive them.”—Marcel Eugene
Bridges64

Washington County, Utah, is a locale of extremes: its landscape is magnificent, its
citizenry is exceedingly warm and generous, and during the early years of the Cold War,
Washingtonians were intense in their patriotic support of the United States’ efforts against the
Soviet Union. Content to live lives of communal interdependence, these people had a strong
sense of individual self-reliance while still committing themselves to the welfare of the
community as a whole. While many residents farmed or ranched for their livings, others ran
local retail businesses, served in the military, staffed local offices for federal programs, and
participated in local fund-raising for charitable causes. Many of these people held steadfastly to
the belief that the federal government should remain as small as possible and should limit its
involvement in its citizens’ everyday affairs, yet they roundly supported the federal
government’s policies in foreign affairs, especially as related to the Soviet Union. This included
local cooperation with Atomic Energy Commission staff whenever they visited the area or
released statements regarding the effects on the local community from Nevada Test Site nuclear
weapons tests. While some openly questioned the AEC’s assertions (in all likelihood, many
more privately questioned these statements), general consensus seems to have been that the
citizens of Washington County genuinely believed that the weapons testing program was in the
best interest of national security.
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Located in the extreme southwestern corner of Utah, Washington County encompasses
1,553,037 acres of land, with 25,000 acres privately owned and another 66,000 acres set aside as
wilderness areas; additionally, the Bureau of Land Management controls approximately 635,000
acres. The Utah Territorial Legislature formed the county on March 3, 1852, and the city of St.
George became the county seat as of January 14, 1863. By 1892, territorial legislature officials
had formed the boundaries of the county as they exist today.65 Comprised mostly of small
hamlets, with the city of St. George the exception, Washington County remained a relatively
sparsely inhabited community into the 1950s and 1960s. County population in 1950 was 9,836,
and by 1960 it had only grown to 10,271; by 2010, the population had reached 130,529.66 In
1953, the populations of the two largest towns was 4,545 in St. George and 1,268 in Hurricane,
with many of the other inhabited areas of the county recording populations around 100.67
Most of the residents of Washington County during this period were devout members of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. In fact, throughout most communities in the
state of Utah, the Mormon church serves as both the center of the community and a
representation of the communal spirituality.68 It was, and largely still is, this religious facet of
life that connected all members of the community. For the Mormon population in general,
acceptance into mainstream American culture had not occurred by the 1950s. Therefore, in an
attempt to legitimate their social standing as American citizens, the church strongly advocated
total allegiance to the national agenda. One long-time Utah resident, in an interview for an oral
history project, stated that “Mormon people as a group of people... from birth they are taught that
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you respect the government; you abide by the laws of the government. And you’re taught that
you were to be patriotic.... It was if the government said it, then that’s the way it was.”69 During
World War II, communities from across Utah had sent young men and women into combat with
the military; thirty-one from Washington County lost their lives during the war.70 The 1950s
ushered in an era during which Washington County residents would pay a much higher price for
their devout patriotism.
These patriotic people were proud of their self-sufficiency. Most had backyard gardens
from which they harvested various fruits and vegetables for immediate consumption; those
farmers who had large plots of cultivable land sold most of their surpluses to other locals. The
variety of local crops was astounding, and the Washington County News (WCN) reported that
county farmers won county fair awards for the following crops: grapes, peaches, apples, prunes,
tomatoes, pears, pomegranates, persimmons, pecans, almonds, black walnuts, English walnuts,
cucumber, pepper, cantaloupe, kohlrabi, squash, jujubes, potatoes, carrots, beets, onions, barley,
wheat, and oats.71 Local ranchers raised livestock which, after slaughter, they sold locally or in
adjoining counties. There were also various dairy farmers who provided milk and dairy products
to area residents who did not own at least one backyard cow, although many residents did own
such an animal. The result was that nearly all residents of Washington County consumed locally
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raised food, a fact which created a great deal of pride, but which, as we will see, also became a
detriment to the long-term health of these people.72
Population growth in the county was quite slow, but with the 1950s came government
programs which brought an increase in both in the number of residents and the amount of money
circulating through the local economy. Federal Civil Defense Administration (Civil Defense)
offices employed local residents and provided the vital public service of educating citizens on
ways that they could prepare for and survive a nuclear attack from an aggressor nation
(specifically, the USSR). The Washington County office also recruited volunteers to staff local
observation posts for the Ground Observer Corps, a nationwide program which required several
hundred thousand volunteers to monitor the skies above the United States for potential Soviet
bombers.73 The biggest boon to the local economy from federal programs came from the
construction and operation of the Hurricane Mesa Test Facility. In 1954, the U.S. Air Force
commissioned Coleman Engineering to construct and operate the facility which tested various
cockpit systems for new Air Force fighter jets.74 Not only did these programs provide jobs to
Washington County citizens, they also imbued to them a sense of pride in that they were active
participants in the nation’s struggle against Communist aggression.
Fear of a Soviet takeover of the United States and worldwide expansion was firmly
entrenched in the psyche of Washingtonians in the 1950s. The WCN regularly ran articles
featuring syndicated columnists who promoted a conservative viewpoint and reinforced these
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beliefs.75 After the announcement that the USSR had successfully detonated a hydrogen bomb
on August 20, 1953, a cartoon appeared which portrayed Joseph Stalin as a dancing hydrogen
bomb waving a Soviet flag and trumpeting a horn.76 An article in 1954 described the possibility
that the Soviets had developed “an excellent rocket” which was “capable of crossing the Atlantic
to bombard the United States” as a “sober” threat.77 A March 1957 front-page article described
the concern caused “when twin vapor trails from either one or two high-flying jet aircraft came
together and the area was rocked by an explosion only seconds later” which was “felt by
hundreds of residents in St. George.”78 Finally, in 1958, assistant editor Nora R. Lyman reacted
to the launch of Sputnik in her weekly column, “Observations.” Lyman wrote that “Russia, with
her lies, deceit, hypocracy [sic] and desire to dominate the whole world with Communism, has
recently played what, so far, is her trumpcard with the release of Sputnik.”79 However, despite
the threat posed by such a development, Lyman intimated that “What I fear more than anything
else lies within our own borders. I refer to Communist infiltration—in our schools, unions,
government, secret weapons plants, communication, power and transportation systems.”80
Given these sentiments, it is not surprising that there was limited outcry from
Washingtonians to the news that atomic bombs would be detonated at the newly created NTS,
with its extreme northeastern border located roughly 160 miles due east of St. George. While
federal officials issued formal announcements of the intention to create a test facility out of the
Las Vegas Bombing and Gunnery Range on January 11, 1951, the first mention in the WCN
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came on January 25. The article, printed at the behest of the AEC’s Las Vegas office, stated that
“‘the U.S. atomic energy commission will use part of the Las Vegas bombing and gunnery range
for test activities, including experimental nuclear detonations for the development of atomic
bombs.... For national security reasons, there will be no public announcement prior to any
tests.’”81 While the final paragraph of the report warned of dangers which may exist to “the
careless, the curious and the hard-to-reach individuals” who might wander onto the test range, it
further stated that “‘tests can be carried out with adequate assurance of safety under the
conditions and controls prevailing at the bombing reservation.’”82 Citizens felt secure in the
assurance that no harmful effects would escape the testing grounds, and there was a veritable
sense of pride that national efforts based in close proximity to their community were impacting
the campaign against the spread of communism.83
The early propensity to view the activities at NTS in this way seems to have been
prevalent among Americans across the nation. Gallup poll data from early in the atmospheric
testing period shows that the majority of Americans supported the testing program and did not
worry about radioactive fallout.84 Even those living in close proximity to the test site felt that it
was their duty to refrain from exploiting property damage claims for personal benefit. During
the first test series, citizens in the area surrounding Las Vegas filed 123 claims for property
damage that totaled around $15,000. Carrol L. Tyler, manager of the AEC office in Santa Fe,
NM, reported that “It is noteworthy that the claims were almost all for actual costs of repairs and
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were justifiable cases.”85 Furthermore, Tyler claimed that “in approximately one-tenth of the
cases property owners waived all claims in the interest of national defense.”86 Following the
second test series in the fall of 1951, citizens from the area filed 161 damage claims with the
AEC office, with two of those coming from Washington County for structural damage. The
AEC claimed that, as with the claims following the first test series, around ten percent of
residents citing damage to property from detonations had stated that they would not file claims.87
It would seem that Washingtonians felt more connected with mainstream America as a result of
their ability to make small sacrifices that contributed to a greater national cause, participate in
national programs (like Civil Defense) in which they engaged to prevent such spread on the
home front, and the common fear that they felt from the threat of global communism.
Throughout the 1950s, the local office of Civil Defense was instrumental in maintaining
this palpable sense of fear in the minds of Washington County citizens. A late 1952 article in the
WCN provided a good example: it reported that the “FCDA [Civil Defense] declares that the
average American city would have to bury 40,000 dead within two days after one atomic bomb
dropped upon it.”88 Compounding the problem of this shocking disclosure, the article estimated
that “70 per cent [sic] of any raiding force of planes probably will get past U.S. air defenses.”89
By 1955, the Civil Defense office began running advertisements in the WCN asking for
volunteers to operate Ground Observer Corps stations for two hours per week in order to provide
advance notice of enemy planes encroaching upon U.S. airspace, thus enabling American fighter
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jets to confront the attackers.90 Local civilians undoubtedly felt that this would be a selfless act
which contributed to national security with the potential for saving thousands of lives.
In October 1952, the Utah State director of civil defense held a course in St. George
which spanned three days in order to educate the local population on “self-preservation” during
an attack. The stated goal was to prepare all American citizens for their respective roles in the
event that a major U.S. city was hit by a Soviet weapon.91 It seems that citizens heeded the call
for volunteering in Civil Defense programs, as numerous related articles throughout the
remainder of the atmospheric testing period cited the willingness of Washingtonians to assist
with various maneuvers. Nora Lyman wrote of the importance of Civil Defense operations in
her Observations column in September 1954. This highly subjective account of the importance
of the Civil Defense program claimed that participation could prevent “a hundred atomic Pearl
Harbors;” would provide “training for those of us who live in the wide, open spaces to accept
and care for the hordes who will flee in terror from the stricken city areas” after a nuclear strike;
and would impart to citizens “the confidence to face whatever may come and the knowledge we
need to protect ourselves.” Furthermore, Lyman warned that “Without it, we may not survive an
attack.... Why not prepare for the worst and hope for the best?”92 Echoing these sentiments,
Marilyn Daniels, a Home Demonstration Agent for 4-H, claimed that Civil Defense programs
were “a way of saving your life and property.”93 According to Washington County’s Civil
Defense director in February 1958, the county was “well organized and prepared to act as a
reception center for 30,000 people in case of attack.”94
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When one compares Civil Defense press releases with those prepared by the Atomic
Energy Commission, one cannot help but notice the change from negative language used to
describe the potential effects of a Soviet weapon to the decidedly positive language used when
referring to experiments with nuclear weapons at NTS. From articles describing the death and
destruction resulting from enemy attack to articles lauding the ways in which U.S. nuclear tests
“contributed to the development and to the utilization of atomic weapons,” the degree to which
the narrative shifts is telling.95 In articles describing bomb blasts, the AEC press releases
included euphemistic phrases such as “the most powerful and brilliant,” “new and improved
nuclear devices,” and “tremendous power and energy released by the atomic explosion dwarfed
the sound and power of conventional shells.”96 Yet another article which reported the recent test
of a nuclear device claimed that “Early rising Utahns in St. George and other sections of
Washington County... were rewarded by the ruddy glow that signaled the blast.”97 The AEC also
made sure always to declare that their experiments had not “resulted in any hazard to humans.”98
However, the commission did warn that there existed the possibility that citizens could be
harmed—from broken glass hurtling through the air after the shock wave from a blast passed
through the area, potentially breaking windows.99 The overall effect then is that language used
in reports of the AEC’s activities portrayed its nuclear devices as benign experiments compared
to the malicious intent and destructive capabilities of Soviet weapons.
Despite the use of such mild psychological manipulation, the AEC encountered problems
in the public relations area from the outset of its experimental program. This resulted from
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stories told by local ranchers and mining speculators who owned Geiger counters. Some local
ranchers began reporting that “strange burns” were afflicting them and their horses and that
unexplained ailments were killing their cattle and sheep. Men who had been or were currently
searching for large uranium deposits reported that “geiger [sic] counters... registered off the
scale.”100 When local citizens expressed anxiety over these occurrences, the AEC was quick to
dismiss such concerns, claiming that local laypersons lacked the scientific background to make
such determinations. AEC officials were also quick to release official statements refuting the
occurrence of readings which indicated that radioactivity levels were unusually high.101 The
AEC attempted to discredit the Geiger counter phenomena by pointing out that the devices were
prone to malfunction and hyper-sensitivity.
When Operation UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE began at NTS in March 1953, the AEC was still
formulating safety standards and emergency procedures; worse, the administrators chose to
ignore certain facts and warnings that could have prevented future accidents, as delays to already
scheduled programs would be costly. During the series, which lasted from March 17 to June 4,
1953, monitors did not operate “farther than 200 miles from the proving ground borders.”102 The
rapidity with which observation personnel reached their maximum radiation exposure further
contributed to the limited monitoring, and caused the AEC to increase the maximum “safe”
level.103 Procedural precedents would have to be sacrificed in order to complete the operation
successfully.
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The level of public concern dramatically increased beginning in April 1953, the same
time that the AEC began detonating higher-yield nuclear weapons at NTS.104 The Simon and
Harry Shots went horribly wrong when their respective fallout clouds were carried swiftly away
from ground zero. A 43-KT explosion, fallout from Simon (detonated April 25) resulted in the
Test Director ordering roadblocks to be erected offsite after the monitors discovered “several
trucks, a Greyhound bus, [and] private cars,” which were contaminated to the east.105 Never
before had the administrators had to order such offsite activities. Although they did not find any
locations where radiation levels were above 0.46 roentgens, safety teams inspected close to “400
vehicles in all and sent 40 for washing,” and the AEC denied that there were any reports of
significant ill health effects.106
In St. George, local service station employees and proprietors reported washing
“approximately 75 cars and trucks.”107 The AEC did not respond to WCN inquiries “as to
whether the unprecedented check of cars and trucks indicated unusual concentrations of
radioactive dust from Saturday morning’s blast had been blown down to the highway.”108
Vehicles stopped for cleaning were travelling north on Highway 91 into Utah from Nevada.
Cleaning operations appear to have been conducted throughout the day, as the article states that
“One service station operator... said he had 14 cars waiting for washing at one time between 5
and 6 p.m.”109 The concern the AEC officials expressed in cleaning the cars of radioactive
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debris does not seem to have been extended to the service station employees attending to the
contaminated vehicles. There is no mention in the sources that these employees used any sort of
special protection to prevent radioactive contamination to their bodies; neither is there a report
that suggests they failed to employ preventative measures.
The Greyhound bus in question had apparently been travelling south on Highway 91, as it
was cleaned at a roadblock in North Las Vegas, according to the article. The report of the
contaminated Greyhound bus is significant in that it seems to have been a basic means of travel
during this time period, as advertisements for Greyhound fares appeared regularly in the WCN
from April 1951 through 1958, when advertisements for automobile dealerships dramatically
increased. It is likely that Washingtonians were aboard the bus, as there was a hub in St. George.
What is perhaps more alarming, though, is that persons from across the U.S. with limited
knowledge of the frequency and effects of NTS experiments were unknowingly contaminated
with radioactive fallout, especially considering that these busses did not have an interior cooling
system and the windows likely would have been down for the trip across the hot desert. In
customary fashion, however, the AEC office did declare “that persons, animals, or crops exposed
to the material were in no danger.”110
However, there is no evidence to suggest that the AEC monitor in St. George inspected
the car wash. Where did the radiation being scrubbed from the vehicles accumulate? Did
service station employees receive higher than normal radiation doses from their proximity to the
radioactive dust? Apparently, in their haste to reassure the populace that there was no danger,
AEC officials ignored the very real dangers from radiation exposure in this and numerous other
instances. As before, the AEC did not abandon the operation or its schedule following these two
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incidents. It did, however, develop a new “‘Highway Rad Safe Plan,’… a formal plan to deal
with any future crisis of the same nature,” which was released in mid-May.111
Despite the scare, there were no comments on the effects of Shot Simon in the WCN until
the second issue after this alarming incident. Even then, it was assistant editor Nora Lyman
remarking that “Atomic detonations are becoming so commonplace with us now that few of us in
this area even raise an eyebrow” when an explosion was seen or felt.112 However, in the
following issue, a front-page article appeared with the headline “Bomb Sears Nevada Area in
Largest Atomic Test; St. George Opinions Vary.” This article announced the previous week’s
test, Shot Encore, and described the experiments the AEC and military conducted during the
exercise. It also stated that the AEC had disclosed that Encore was “the largest military and
civilian effects nuclear test ever held in this country.”113 While the text of the article failed to
clarify further the assertion that opinions in St. George varied, Nora Lyman addressed the
concern in her weekly column. She quoted Clarence N. Stover, research administrator of the
radiobiological laboratory at the University of Utah, as stating that “the cloud... was traveling so
high and so fast that there was little or no fallout.”114 Lyman suggested that
the reason for so much agitation and excitement was that the wind was extremely high, and
the thermometer kept jumping around without rime or reason. We are accustomed, more or
less, to an occasional dust fury early in spring, but the temperature is usually stable. Friday,
the combination of black clouds, threatening rain, cold, dust and an atom detonation resulted
in all sorts of wild rumors.115
It seems that residents had become a bit more concerned than previously about the effects the
detonations were having on their community.
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A few weeks after the Simon Shot, on May 19, a wind shift at the time of detonation sent
the radioactive cloud from Shot Harry, a 32-KT device, moving over areas of Nevada and Utah.
Despite the fact that test managers had determined that the weather was “‘perfectly satisfactory
for this shot,’” fallout rained particularly hard on the communities of Cedar City, Utah, and St.
George.116 The AEC’s Health and Safety Laboratory offsite personnel wasted no time
implementing the formal offsite safety procedures. However, since the yield of Harry was
considerably less than Simon, administrators believed that the radiation levels would not surpass
those which occurred during Simon. When radiation readings in St. George reached 0.3
roentgens per hour, the AEC again conducted its roadblock and free car-wash service along
affected highways and warned the population of St. George to stay indoors from shortly after 9
a.m. until noon.117
According to reports of the incident, only residents within the St. George municipality
were warned of the impending danger. It seems that citizens of other parts of Washington
County were oblivious to the radioactive threat. Since the AEC still claimed publicly that
radiation did not pose harmful effects in cumulative doses, but, rather, wore off after a short
time, it continued to assert “that ‘radiation had not reached a hazardous level’” and even children
in public schools “were allowed out by lunchtime.”118 The mishap was so dramatic that the AEC
announced in August 1953 that it would begin “work on a documentary film record.... including
efforts to keep St. George residents indoors” while the radioactive cloud passed over the area.119
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Ironically, the WCN issue which followed this latest AEC miscalculation featured a letter
to the editor from a University of Utah student and resident of St. George. Ralph J. Hafen wrote
that he had conducted “considerable research into the problem of radiation” and felt “morally
obligated to warn people of the irreparable damage that may have occurred or may in the future
occur.”120 Mr. Hafen claimed that scientific interpretation of available data had resulted “in
sharp dispute” among members of the scientific community as to the possibility of
“physiological injury” to humans from radiation exposure.121 Further asserting that “Your
health, your children’s health and the health of generations yet unborn are at stake,” Hafen
pointed out four problem areas which AEC officials had not addressed: inhalation of fallout
debris, effects of beta radiation (as opposed to gamma radiation), the amount of radiation
contamination in areas outside the St. George area, and the potential for radiation to cause
hereditary mutations.122
Hafen concluded by stating that the AEC was “morally obligated to clear up [these
issues] before continuing with their tests in Nevada.”123 Evidently, Mr. Hafen’s letter was not
well received by the Health Division of the Utah State Civil Defense Administration, as it sent a
letter to the editor which appeared two weeks later. Without citing Mr. Hafen’s letter directly,
the department claimed that “We feel that every citizen has the right to know the truth about this
situation, and would like to avoid any undue anxiety which might have been caused by wild
rumors.”124 It further stated that it had sent two physicians to the area to investigate, who had
found “that it was highly improbable that any person could receive damage from the recent ‘fall-
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out.’”125 Then, in August, the AEC increased its public relations efforts when it sent two
representatives to the St. George area in order “to discover the feelings of the public regarding
the tests and to uncover possible misconceptions.”126
Despite the two experimental debacles, the AEC continued with its final two scheduled
detonations, and even detonated the largest device yet at NTS on June 6. Shot Climax yielded
61-KT, yet there are no reports in the WCN regarding fallout scares or damaged property in
Washington County. Still, the spring 1953 mishaps had taken their toll on the AEC’s public
image, and the commission made the decision to relocate all 1954 experiments to its Bikini
facility. After more than a year away from the NTS, the AEC scheduled a new test series to
begin in February 1955. Before firing the first shot, however, a conference of AEC officials and
health officials from Utah convened to discuss the myriad ways in which AEC test coordinators
attempted to protect public health. The measures included giving “great consideration... as to
where the wind will carry the particles,” evaluating “water and milk samples... for the presence
of radio activity in the area,” and posting personnel at both “fixed stations” and “mobile units...
in all communities adjacent” to the testing grounds.127 Test directors fired the first shot of the
new test series less than a week later on February 18.
The inception of the new series sparked a new wave of concern among Washingtonians.
St. George city officials attempted to calm the citizenry by reiterating the AEC’s public safety
claims. The WCN reported that “the mayor and city officers feel there is no danger, as the fallout is not great enough to cause danger.”128 Apparently, city officials had consulted AEC
officials who had compared the amount of radiation received from fallout to the amount one
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received from an X-ray, “so they felt there was no cause for worry.”129 Nora Lyman helped to
perpetuate this explanation three weeks later in her weekly column, writing that “doctors and
officials... say that radiation is about one-twentieth of that experienced in an X-ray.”130 Lyman
went on to claim that readers who were concerned should feel thankful that they were not one
“of the three men who left St. George in an airplane the day of the explosion and, inadvertently,
flew right through the cloud.”131
Despite the admonishments not to worry, fears continued, even if not in the public view.
In October 1957, an article appeared which reported the highest fallout readings for St. George
(0.5 roentgens), Veyo (0.63 roentgens), and Shivwits Indian Reservation (0.54 roentgens), all
communities located in Washington County. The article further claimed that the Utah State
Department of Health had initiated “a study of the effects on Utah residents of fallout from the
atomic bomb tests in Nevada,” and quoted Dr. Joseph P. Kesler of the Utah State Department as
saying that “there is now... ‘a danger only in potential,’” and that “the present accumulation of
radioactive materials resulting from the annual tests has probably not caused any injury.”132 The
article concluded by claiming that some officials feared that “continued testing could possibly
raise the radioactive level past the danger point.”133
Still, a local observer claimed that during the period surrounding Shot Harry, “People in
St. George... were relatively unconcerned. The common reaction was that, if the United States
tests were needed, then they had to be conducted.”134 Even after a fallout scare from large
detonations in the Soviet Union in 1961, and despite resumed testing at NTS following a nearly
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three year moratorium, “worry here [in St. George] is at a minimum.”135 An article appearing in
the WCN just before Christmas 1961 responded to the newly raised concerns. The article,
“Don’t Worry About Fallout,” cited an interview with Dr. Ralph E. Jorgenson, the president of
the Utah State Medical Association, in which he conceded that scientists were not fully in
agreement with one another on the health effects of radioactive fallout. He then asserted that
“there isn’t very much that us average folks can do about it anyway.... If there is radioactive
fallout in the air, we’ll get some of it, and there’s nothing we can do about it.”136 According to
the doctor, “the best tonic for good health is to be happy, [so] let’s be happy this Christmas
season.”137
An advertisement taken out in the WCN in August 1963 by Lloyd E. Howard of La
Verkin provides further evidence that concern had not turned to paralytic fear even more than a
decade removed from the first NTS tests. Mr. Howard admonished readers to “ACT NOW FOR
FREEDOM” by writing Utah’s federal Senators and recommending that they vote against the
proposed Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT).138 Mr. Howard claimed that the LTBT would
threaten U.S. national security and be “meaningless as a restraint on Soviet aggression,” and
argued that the Soviets “used the last test ban moratorium to secretly prepare for nuclear
testing.”139 Despite the passage of the LTBT by both countries and the USSR’s adherence to its
stipulations, Washingtonians remained convinced that atmospheric nuclear detonations were a
vital part of the nation’s security.
It is clear that throughout the atmospheric weapons testing period, patriotism trumped
anxiety over potential adverse health effects among Washington County’s population. While
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many citizens did openly express their apprehension at the fallout raining down upon their heads,
town officials and newspaper editors made sure that they parroted the AEC declarations that
radiation exposure had not resulted in any danger to the human population. Furthermore, appeals
to their status as average Americans, rather than viewed as condescension of their intellectual
capabilities, likely caused this small Mormon community to feel more accepted by mainstream
society. It is also likely that it served to prevent many Washingtonians from conducting any
independent research into the problem of nuclear radiation, although, even if they had committed
to doing such research, the available, publicly accessible published sources would have only
served to reinforce the AEC’s faulty assertions. The phenomenon which both the AEC and the
citizens of Washington County failed to recognize was the effect of radiation on the surrounding
environment, both biological and geological.
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THE UNSEEN ENEMY: FARMING PRACTICES, RADIATION, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
“The history of life on earth has been a history of interaction between living things and their
surroundings.”—Rachel Carson140
AEC scientists gave little thought or effort in the early years of atmospheric testing to
studying the effects of fallout particles absorbed or ingested by flora and fauna in the paths of the
radioactive clouds which passed over communities like Washington County. As late as 1959,
Dr. John N. Wolfe, the chief scientist of the Environmental Sciences Branch of the Division of
Biology and Medicine at the AEC, testified before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
(JCAE) that “the major problems confronting man in atomic energy are ecological. Fallout,
whatever its intensity, needs study as to its distribution and redistribution by wind, water, ice,
food chains, biotic migration, and abscised plant parts. Disposal of radioactive by-products
presents a continuing problem of an environmental nature....”141 The AEC was not, however, an
agency which placed a premium on continuity.
Five years after Wolfe’s testimony, Dr. Gordon M. Dunning, head of the Division of
Biology and Medicine at the AEC, published a work in which he claimed that “fallout particles
consisting of inert materials together with the associated radioactive materials settle to the earth’s
surface where most of them remain and thus never get inside our bodies.”142 Dunning seemed to
be assuming, counter to the previous suggestions made by one of his subordinates, that wind
would not move the particles, human activities such as mining or farming would not disturb the
particles, and that these particles would not land on animals or plants for human consumption. It
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proved to be an issue which received attention too late, however, as Washington County, known
as Utah’s Dixie for its abundant variety of agricultural products, was above all else an
agricultural community in the 1950s.
An April 1959 article in the Washington County News cited “the long growing season,
mild winters and favorable grazing conditions” of the region as the primary factors in making
Washington County a prime area for agricultural industry.143 In June 1951, county agent Melvin
S. Burningham reported that he had obtained the 1950 agricultural census records for Dixie’s
farming industry. As of 1949, there were 706 farms with 17,898 acres of irrigated land, and an
additional 19,042 acres of pasture land; of the irrigated land, farmers devoted 7,000 acres to
winter wheat, 6,000 acres to alfalfa, and 2,500 acres to barley production.144 By the time of the
1954 agricultural count, the county’s agricultural production grossed nearly $800,000: eightythree percent of this total came from the field crops of winter wheat, alfalfa, and barley; thirteen
percent came from fruit crops; and the remaining four percent came from vegetable crops and
“horticultural specialties.”145 In 1958, a series of storms wreaked havoc on area farms, dealing
an estimated $100,000 in damages to crops previously listed, as well as cherry, apricot, quince,
plum, and strawberry crops.146 Agricultural enterprises were so prevalent in the county that even
in the 1950s and 1960s Washington County was hosting foreign exchange students through the
international farm youth exchange program and agricultural delegates from foreign nations.147
Another important aspect of Dixie’s agricultural industry was its livestock production,
including cattle, sheep, and turkeys, as well as dairy and feed products associated with the
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industry. In 1950, ranchers had more than 20,000 cattle and 55,000 sheep grazing on the lands
comprising the Dixie national forest, and the numbers stayed roughly the same for 1951 and
1952.148 The 1954 agricultural census revealed that the total worth of livestock and livestock
products exceeded $2.7 million, with $1.168 million in poultry, $1.120 million in cattle, and
$422,840 in dairy products.149 By 1959, there were in excess of 30,000 cattle valued at more
than $6 million in Washington County, and Barlocker Farms, Inc., a company based in the small
community of Enterprise, sold more than one million turkeys annually.150
Perhaps the single-most important agricultural enterprise in Washington County, relative
to the atmospheric weapons testing period, was the dairy industry. Many people in the area
believed that milk was a critical part of healthy diets, and one local even proclaimed that “nature
undoubtedly intended milk to be an excellent food, as it falls so little short of perfection.”151
Many residents, especially in rural areas of the county, owned a backyard cow from which they
derived their supplies of milk and butter. According to a 1981 DOE publication that had
surveyed residents from 1951-1962, “55 percent obtained milk from their own cow, 44 percent
drank milk with every meal,” “22 percent fed their children fresh cow’s milk, 56 percent
obtained their drinking water from a spring, and 65 percent grew leafy vegetables.”152 In most
cases, these home-grown dairy products were unpasteurized, as evidenced by articles in the local
newspaper promoting buying pasteurized milk and home pasteurization methods.153 Even by
late 1959, an investigation was under way that had already “found that many people are still
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selling raw milk without a permit.”154 In 1953, the Washington County Dairy Herd
Improvement Association reported that the average output for association cows was 9,779
pounds of milk and 386 pounds of butterfat per cow; this was more than 3,000 pounds of milk
and 140 pounds of butterfat per cow above the state average for Utah.155 By 1956, Nora Lyman
reported that, in the fourteen year existence of the Washington County Dairy Herd Association,
the local industry had grown from supplying 100 gallons of milk per day to 3,300 gallons.156
Dairy producers in Dixie supplied not only the local population with milk, butter, and
cheese, but by the mid-1950s were also shipping a large portion of their unpasteurized dairy to
distributors in Utah and Las Vegas.157 Hi-Land Dairy’s ad lauded itself as “Utah’s First and
Finest Carton Milk,” while the Washington County Dairy Association was promoting Anderson
Dairy Products out of Las Vegas because it processed the area’s unpasteurized dairy goods
before returning them to Washington County as pasteurized milk, cheese and butter.158
Furthermore, the ad claimed that “over one-half million dollars a year [are] sent into Washington
County by Anderson.”159 The Washington County Dairy Association secured the contract with
Anderson sometime in late 1952 or early 1953, and contracted with Anderson in October 1956 to
have their own milk distributed within the county.160
This was significant for Washingtonians because radioactive fallout from near-earth
blasts carries high concentrations of short-lived radionuclides, including the radioactive isotope
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of iodine (I-131), which, Dr. Dunning conceded, “will be deposited relatively quickly and can
enter the food chain.”161 This entry comes primarily through the consumption of milk, and about
thirty percent of the I-131 is then deposited in the thyroid gland regardless of organ size.
According to Dunning, “an infant’s thyroid gland of about two grams weight would receive 10
times more radiation dose than the 20 gram adult’s thyroid for the same amount of iodine 131
ingested.”162 He went on to admit that “direct measurements of iodine 131 in milk were not
made around the Nevada Test Site during earlier times of testing since it was the consensus of
scientists within and outside the AEC and Government at that time that the limiting factor was
the potential external whole body exposure.”163 In fact, the AEC did not measure ingested
radioactive contaminants which had entered the food chain from 1951 through the completion of
the 1958 test series.164
The agency did, however, understand the dangers associated with exposure to radioactive
I-131 prior to Shot Harry, as Frank Butrico, the AEC monitor stationed in St. George during the
event, had orders to test the local milk for I-131.165 It is unclear whether Butrico was acting on
his own volition or under orders when he chose to collect his sample from “several purchases
from stores so as not to create alarm,” but his measurements could not have been accurate since
he chose not to acquire samples from local sources as Washingtonians would have done.166
According to the DOE report, Butrico had become “concerned that radioactivity might get into
the milk supply from cows eating contaminated vegetation.”167 Later studies indicated that there
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was a significant potential for “thyroid abnormalities” in children as a result of ingesting milk
which had been contaminated with I-131.168
Dunning’s claims of scientific consensus were disingenuous, as the National Committee
on Radiation Protection had come to the conclusion nearly twenty years earlier that the
“tolerance dose” theory of radiation damage, which proposed that radiation exposure below a
certain threshold was typically not dangerous, was incorrect.169 Following Polish physicist
Marie Curie’s discovery of radium in 1898, physicians began using the element as a treatment
for cancer patients, although some scientists soon warned that there were potentially serious
health consequences which may result from exposure to radium.170 Despite the early warnings,
radium was popularized as a medicinal supplement in the patented Radithor water manufactured
by Bailey Radium Laboratories, and was also used in everyday products such as toothpaste and
hair creams, as well as luminescent paints. It was not until the 1920s that the effects of the
radioactive element received proper attention in regard to its potential damage to the human
body.
Dr. Harrison Stanford Martland’s 1925 article in the Journal of the American Medical
Association presented critical evidence that the practice of consuming radium was indeed
harmful and potentially fatal.171 By 1932, the American Medical Association had disqualified
radium from its index of substances “approved for internal administration.”172 From 1928 to
1929, both the International X-Ray and Radium Protection Committee (1928) and the American
X-Ray and Radium Protection Committee (1929) had established their safety dose guidelines on
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admittedly deficient proof of the effects of radiation. While neither committee declared “that its
tolerance dose was definitive” and both conceded that injury may result from exposure to any
amount of radiation, both “considered levels below the tolerance dose to be generally safe and
unlikely to cause permanent damage to the ‘average individual.’”173
In 1965, the U.S. Department of Agriculture published an article in Farmer’s Bulletin
entitled “Defense against Radioactive Fallout on the Farm,” in which the government gave
advice for protecting America’s farmlands from suffering catastrophic damage in the event of a
foreign nuclear attack.174 It asserted that “early fallout consists of heavy particles that are
deposited within 24 hours after a nuclear explosion and usually within a few hundred miles from
the explosion.”175 Of the tests which resulted in radiation clouds dumping fallout in the
Washington County area, wind pattern reports show that fallout from the clouds arrived between
six and twelve hours from the time of detonation.176 This time frame meant that Washington
County received fallout from the passing clouds during the period in which the heaviest and most
radioactive particles fell back to earth from the force of the explosion. However, there was no
monitoring system in place for detecting long-range fallout at the first NTS test shot. Only after
fallout was detected at the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York, did the AEC recognize
the need for off-site fallout monitoring. To that point, AEC scientists claimed to believe that
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offsite monitoring was unwarranted and, therefore, had not implemented such a system to track
radiation outside the boundaries of NTS.177
In examining the question of the length of time radioactive fallout would contaminate
agricultural lands, the USDA article indicated that the contamination period was dependent on
the amount and kinds of radioactive debris in a specific location.178 The authors were very clear,
however, in stating that “fallout can contaminate food, water, buildings, yards, and fields, and
make them unsafe to use for varying periods of time. Generally, food and water are not difficult
to decontaminate, nor are buildings or paved areas. Yards and fields may be very difficult.”179
As well, the article asserted that “vegetables that are exposed to heavy fallout may become
highly contaminated. Leaves, pods, and fruits that retain fallout material should be cleaned
before being eaten. Washing is probably the most effective measure.”180 Unfortunately for those
prepared farmers who had thoroughly studied this document, there was no precise description as
to how water could be decontaminated, as food was to be washed with water to help
decontaminate it. Where in the desert environs of Washington County was uncontaminated
water to be obtained when the entire county had been irradiated by nuclear fallout?
Furthermore, the revelation that whole fields and pastures could be irreparably
contaminated was a real threat, since the result of farm animals consuming polluted food
necessarily meant they would ingest and absorb some amounts of radiation. When farmers
slaughtered these animals for food, radioactive elements would have contaminated the local food
supply.181 Despite these revelations, the federal government continued to deny through the
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1980s that sheep ranchers and farmers in southwestern Utah had been exposed to excessive
amounts of radiation during the early years of NTS testing activities. The article went on to state
that “radioactive iodine is secreted in the milk of cattle; it thus is a particular threat to young
children drinking milk from cows grazing on contaminated pasture during the first few weeks
following a nuclear attack.”182 The fact that a government agency unaffiliated with the AEC
disseminated this information so soon after the abolition of atmospheric nuclear weapons testing
in 1963 leads to devastating questions regarding how the science related to the hazards of
radiation contamination of food and water supplies had developed so rapidly in less than two
years. Despite the AEC’s assertions that it would in no way continue with operations at its
continental test site if a legitimate threat from radioactive fallout existed, the scientific evidence
which directly refuted AEC reassurances had existed for many years, and was only publicly
acknowledged in the context of the potential destructive capabilities of Soviet weapons and
following the conclusion of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty.
Again, however, the brief history of atomic experimentation prior to the 1951 continental
testing program proves that the AEC was terribly short-sighted in light of ongoing scientific
observation. Three years following the July 1946 detonation of the Baker device on the
southeast cape of Bikini Atoll, the AEC and the University of Washington’s Applied Fisheries
Laboratory jointly produced a report which determined that their three years of exhaustive
research had not yielded conclusive solutions to the continuing problem of radiation in local food
sources. The report concluded that radioactive elements persisted in both native plants and
animals, even though the military had detonated the weapon more than ninety feet underwater.183
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The national press sensationalized the story, with such titles as the Washington Post’s article,
“It’s Safe to Live on Bikini But Not Eat Its Products.” However, the articles explicitly stated
that “scientists still can’t say when—or whether—the natives will be able to return to the Pacific
atoll” which was formerly their homeland.184 That these articles appeared in major national
newspapers “a day after President Truman’s announcement that the Soviet Union apparently had
developed an atomic weapon of its own” provides grim evidence that officials involved in
locating a continental testing site would not permit data gathered through objective scientific
observation to deter plans for the facility or the furthering of U.S. nuclear ambitions.185
From the perspective of thirty-three years post-Trinity, twenty-seven years following the
first detonation at NTS, and twenty-six years following the first detonation of a thermonuclear
weapon, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) could reasonably claim that
the Trinity explosion “had a nominal explosive yield of 20 kilotons.”186 A 1978 EPA report
showed that the fallout cloud from the Trinity explosion moved northeast from the detonation
site in conjunction with the prevailing winds. By examining “the intensity of beta-gamma
radiation from fission product deposition,” officials had estimated the distribution of groundlevel radioactive fallout within a few weeks of the experiment.187 Even thirty-three years after
the Trinity test, “the highways and major unpaved roads” surrounding, but outside the
boundaries of the White Sands Missile Range, held “detectable amounts of Trinity plutonium in
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the surface 5 centimeters of soil.”188 Although the Trinity Site is far to the east-southeast of
Washington County, a 1983 study by a group of University of California—Los Angeles
scientists revealed that Cesium-137 (Cs-137) had remained in the local topsoil between “5-7
centimeters because of the arid climate and was easily absorbed into local vegetation and
thereafter passed to the animal population.”189 These reports demonstrate that officials knew, at
the latest within a few months of the Trinity detonation, that radioactive fallout from a western
desert testing site had the potential to blow to the northeast and outside the boundaries of the
established testing grounds. Yet, AEC officials chose to ignore the data which could have
prevented unnecessary contamination of population centers.
The elevation at which a nuclear weapon explodes is a significant factor in the amount
and size of fallout particles which are then deposited locally and regionally.190 As a result, the
types of experiments conducted at NTS had a significant impact on the region surrounding the
test site. When nuclear detonations occur close to ground level, the explosive power lifts a huge
amount of macerated soil into the mushroom cloud and transports it around 15 miles into the
atmosphere.191 Weapons detonated near the earth’s surface produce radioactive fallout which
falls back to the ground relatively quickly, dropping around half of the material created within a
few hundred miles of the detonation. Of the NTS atmospheric tests from 1951-1963 which
produced more than one kiloton of explosive force, only three occurred above 1,000 feet; thirteen
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detonations occurred within 100 feet of ground level, and an additional fifty-five occurred
between 100 feet and 500 feet.192 Therefore, NTS tests predominantly produced fallout which
returned to the earth’s surface over a very short distance and period of time.
Testifying before the JCAE in 1959, Dr. John Wolfe stated that
Radiation has become an intensified factor in the environment of man and the living things
upon which he is dependent for food and shelter. The ecological effects of this increase are
not known. Nor can they be determined by experiment alone, nor by considering only a
single source of increased radiation such as fallout. Determination of the total impact of this
factor on man’s biotic environment and the evolution of living organisms therein, is a
continuing problem.193
For residents living in the downwind area of Washington County, gamma radiation to the entire
body from “short-lived radionuclides” represented the most serious immediate danger of fallout
exposure.194 The unpredictable nature of fallout meant that residents in rural locales were at
higher risk of being exposed “to high doses from short-lived radionuclides and... pockets of
intense long-lived radioactivity as well. The highly localized nature of hot spots and their remote
location make it unlikely that they would be found without immense efforts and perhaps not even
then.”195 The AEC certainly did not exert “immense efforts” to measure radioactive hot spots
when deciding to limit their off-site monitoring program to roadways. Gordon Dunning even
admitted that scientists understood that ingestion of fallout particles could cause health
complications but stopped short of saying the AEC had failed downwind residents through
limited monitoring practices which did not include pasture land or household gardens in
Washington County.196 The AEC completely neglected their responsibilities regarding public
safety in this respect since, by the conclusion of the 1958 test series, the agency was not
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monitoring the degree to which downwinders were ingesting radioactive particles which filtered
through the food chain.197
The AEC, and Dunning in particular, often pointed to the size and frequency of Soviet
weapons tests as the major contributing factor of above-average radiation levels while
maintaining that U.S. weapons tests had a negligible effect on American citizens. However, in
testimony before the JCAE, J. E. Campbell stated that general studies of radioactive
contamination of the nation’s milk supply showed that “concentrations of iodine-131, barium140, and strontium-89 varied widely, the higher levels being associated with the number of
nuclear weapons tests per month in the United States, while tests conducted elsewhere in the
world had a noticeable but lesser effect on the values observed.”198 How much higher were the
concentrations of radioactivity in Washington County’s milk supply during NTS tests? The data
is lost to history as a result of the AEC placing a higher premium on public perception of its
activities than on the safety of Washingtonians.
There is no question that Washington County’s cows were particularly susceptible to
radiation contamination and thus to pass along I-131 to those people who drank milk from
contaminated cows. I-131 was the most pervasive radionuclide in terms of ingestion exposure,
as “ninety of the atmospheric tests at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) deposited high levels of I-131
(5.5 hexabequerels) across a large portion of the contiguous United States, especially in the years
1952, 1953, 1955, and 1957.”199 Washington County’s proximity to the NTS meant that high
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levels of radioactive particles contaminated pastures in agricultural and ranching areas.200
According to a 1999 National Research Council study, I-131 contaminates cows’ milk when the
animal ingests grasses from contaminated land. Whereas scientists recorded measurements for
total fallout deposition, “few measurements of I-131 or total beta decay in cows’ milk or in
pasture were made during the testing.”201 The report also stated that a given animal’s secretion
rate of I-131 into its milk could range from one to twenty percent of the amount ingested, and
that this rate is not constant, but fluctuates from animal to animal, as well as “in the same animal
at different times.”202 Furthermore, it suggested that it is “probable” that milk from backyard
cows would be produced at a lower rate and contain higher concentrations of I-131.203
Utah’s federal representatives and senators were acutely aware of the concern of their
citizens with regard to the weapons tests at NTS, particularly as they related to the effect of
radioactive fallout on milk consumption. However, this awareness does not seem to be present
until the early 1960s, after the conclusion of the vast majority of atmospheric tests at NTS.
When tests resumed in 1961, citizens became more vociferous in questioning the AEC’s
methods. In July 1962, John and Mary Cary wrote Utah’s U.S. Senator Frank Edward Moss
(elected 1958) asking, “Why can’t this be done out in the Pacific? When Russia made nuclear
tests last winter there were many public reports of increased fallout in the United States. Now
this debris is being blown in the air right out in Nevada and we don’t hear a thing on the
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increased radiation hazard. Who’s kidding who?”204 Moss’s reply to them is telling, in that he
admitted he was ignorant of the technical details of radiation effects and would instead refer their
letter to AEC Chairman Dr. Glenn Theodore Seaborg for an answer.205 Moss did try to reassure
the Carys that they were in no danger, and imparted to them his “understanding that special
precautions had been taken to help control the fallout in the United States.”206
The issue of contaminated milk seems to have gained much public attention by the
summer of 1962. Two weeks after Moss’ reply to the Carys, Henry Harwood of Spanish Fork,
Utah, wrote to Senator Moss with concerns about the economic impact that resumed testing and
increased exposure would have on the dairy industry. Harwood wrote
I suppose you realize what the recent dispute over milk is going to do to the consumption.
This along with new roads cutting [… unintelligible] in half is rather hard to swallow. I am
certainly for our country and preparedness, but things must be considered. Damages should
be paid to those who are damaged. It would appear to me that if we loose [sic] any market
someone owes us some money. You remember the Geneva Steel Payments to the stockmen
and farming! I see very little difference. Off [sic] course there is a chance things may not
be to [sic] bad, and come out all right. It seems there is some place they could shoot those
bombs off some place where they would cause less trouble. Those selling other drinks bring
much of this publicity and can’t Washington do something to see the dairy people through
this thing?207
By Spring 1963, the outcry reached near-hysteria, as both Moss and W. H. Bennett,
Director of the Extension Services at Utah State University, began lobbying Seaborg to delay the
scheduled series of tests “during this grazing season so as to protect the milk users.”208 Wynne
Thorne, the Director of Utah State University’s Agricultural Experiment Station, also wrote to
Senator Moss, claiming that “Iodine 131 has only an 8-day half-life and is, therefore, of primary
importance as a contaminant in market milk. Deferring testing to the winter months would in no
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way reduce the value of the data obtained [from testing]. I can see no valid objection to such a
course of action.”209
Seaborg responded to these requests with typical AEC dismissive condescension. More
than one month after Moss’s letter to him, Seaborg replied by minimizing concerns regarding
I-131 contamination of milk supplies. He continued by pointing out the lengths to which the
AEC had gone in order to ensure public safety:
To keep atmospheric radioactive contamination as low as possible, nuclear testing at Nevada
has been primarily conducted underground. The detonation time is carefully selected with
respect to the weather as an additional safeguard should any radioactivity reach the
atmosphere. Extensive computation and prediction techniques are undertaken to minimize
the probability of any specific locality receiving repeated fallout.210
Nearly three months later, Seaborg categorically rejected the possibility of restricting testing to
winter months in order to eliminate the threat of I-131 in milk, since doing so “could place
unacceptable restrictions on the conduct of important tests.”211 His attitude, coupled with the
numerous fallout incidents and miscalculations it had committed, demonstrated that the AEC
was far more dedicated to furthering nuclear weapons capabilities than to ensuring the safety of
American citizens, despite its mandate to perform both duties with equal alacrity.
The self-sufficiency of Washington County residents in relation to their food sources
meant that they were at much higher risk of harmful exposure to I-131. The AEC’s average
exposure estimates and selective monitoring practices do not take into account Washington
County’s residents, since, on an individual basis, “exposure depends on such critical factors as
varying individual consumption of milk and other foods and variations in the source of those
foods.”212 In fact, because there were significant numbers of young children in the community
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and most of this population drank milk from backyard cows and goats, Washington County’s
residents must have received considerable doses of I-131.213 The evidence to establish this fact,
however, does not exist because the AEC did not monitor contamination of food or milk until
1958, after scientists published irrefutable evidence that, of the radionuclides created in a nuclear
explosion, exposure to I-131 presented the most significant danger to human health.214 A Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratories study from 1950 affirmed that “there appears to be no feasible
means for salvaging unprotected food, either in the home, the store or in the fields, which has
become radioactively contaminated,” despite previous assertions from the AEC that thorough
washing of contaminated vegetables could cleanse them of health risks.215
I-131 is the most significant radionuclide relating to Washington County’s experiences
during nuclear weapons testing because scientists definitively discovered following the 1986
Chernobyl nuclear power plant disaster that I-131 has the potential to produce thyroid cancer.216
By no means, however, was it the only radionuclide which presented significant problems for
Washington County residents. Atmospheric nuclear weapons experiments also produced the
radioactive isotopes strontium-90 (half-life 28.8 years) and cesium-137 (half-life 30 years) and
spread them globally, although nearby downwind populations were at highest risk of hazardous
contamination. Along with plutonium-239, these long-lived radioactive isotopes “constitute
pervasive pollutants in our food and water” even to the present day.217
Gordon Dunning reported in 1964 that “about 20 million curies of strontium 90 have
been created by atmospheric nuclear tests with about 17 million curies of this being spread
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globally. The other 3 million curies fell quickly in areas local to the testing sites.”218 The 1965
Farmer’s Bulletin warned that “strontium-90 falls on the surface of plants and can be consumed
with foods and forage. Some of it is deposited directly on the soil or washed into it, remaining
indefinitely—for all practical purposes—in the top several inches of uncultivated land.”219 In the
same publication, under the heading “Would fallout permanently affect pasture grass and forage
crops?” the article claimed that heavy accumulation of fallout could produce “external radiation
[which] would prohibit use of the pasture.”220
Whereas strontium-90 is chemically similar to calcium and tends to accumulate in the
bones, cesium-137 (Ce-137), while comprising only “about 0.05 percent” of total fallout yield
from each test, distributes itself primarily throughout the soft tissues of the human body at a
generally uniform rate.221 This particular isotope of cesium “only exists in a manmade state
either as a by-product of a nuclear explosion, or as a radionuclide produced in a nuclear
reactor.”222 Blair Bentley, a student at Oregon State University and native of Washington
County, conducted a 2008 study which examined the Ce-137 levels in southwestern Utah. With
eighty-five soil samples taken from Washington County, Bentley found that the average
Washington County reading was 380.7 becquerels per square meter and concluded that the
region is still contaminated with radioactive cesium, since “nearly 4 times the measured amount
today, existed in the soil shortly after the [atmospheric] testing was complete.”223 Based on this
study, Bentley proved that AEC estimates of fallout deposition in the county were far too low.
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Ingested and inhaled alpha and beta particles are less penetrating than gamma particles,
and are most harmful when the body assimilates them, thus injuring the organs and cells near the
point at which they settle.224 While ingestion of contaminated food and water was a problem for
the entire downwind population, farmers, schoolchildren, and anyone outdoors as fallout clouds
passed, were at especially high risk of receiving high doses of radiation from both short- and
long-lived radionuclides.225 This was a serious problem for St. George, since it received “the
highest concentration of radioactive debris in the air in a populated area off-site” during the
atmospheric testing period.226 Dunning estimated this concentration “was about 1.3 millionth of
a curie per cubic meter averaged over the 24 hours the activity was present.”227
This was particularly pertinent to Washington County, since the Washington County
News reported that St. George’s Dixie College experienced “heavy registration for Dixie’s famed
outdoor classes” and had promoted itself as an ideal venue for outdoor courses and activities in
March 1953.228 Two weeks later, an editorial by PTA member Montrue Larkin implored St.
George residents to donate “$1 per family” to help address the “dust and dirt problem” of local
schools to plant a lawn in order to prevent schoolchildren who would “come home at the end of a
school day, grimy with dust and dirt” from returning home so dirty.229 As fertile as Washington
County is, it is still arid desert land in most places and is comprised of a great deal of dirt and
subject to desert dust storms. By spring 1955, residents like Nora Lyman began speculating that
there was a link between the nuclear tests at NTS and “dust storms such as we have never
experienced in this country.... I believe that the A-Bomb detonations have been responsible to a
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large degree. The AEC admit, I am told, that these shots do cause wind, but not rain.”230 In
August, Lyman again reported “freak storms and floods” in the area, stating, “Personally, I am
wondering what effect, if any, the 42 atomic bombs, shot off on Yucca Flat this spring, had upon
the wind and weather.”231 Regardless of whether the experiments were creating dust storms,
local residents, and especially children, were no doubt directly affected, since “children playing
outdoors, and therefore possibly breathing heavily, would have been especially at risk of high
inhalation doses.”232 The Overview of the Department of Energy’s Off-Site Radiation Exposure
Project (ORERP) of 1990 found that internal exposures from inhaled and ingested radionuclides
“were comparable in magnitude to whole-body doses resulting from external γ [gamma]
exposure.”233
The composition of the earth’s surface is a major factor in determining contamination
levels from fallout. Rocky hillsides are generally more heavily contaminated than sandy valleys
because there is a slower absorption of particulate debris; fallout settling in these areas tends to
remain until rainfall washes it into lower-lying areas.234 Valleys comprised of loose soil tend to
absorb fallout particles more quickly, where it is then taken into the roots of any present
vegetation. During the summer months, when the AEC conducted most of the NTS tests, the
southwestern corner of Utah experiences a wet monsoon which generally results in daily
afternoon thunderstorms.235 These storms tend to produce rainfall which passes quickly over the
surface of the soil, providing water to “shallow-rooted species” of plants. Thus, gardens and
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cultivated farmland would have had radioactive particles seep more quickly into the soil from
which the flora derived water and nutrients.236 Any fallout debris remaining at the surface level
when the gentle winter rains began would be washed from hillsides and accumulate in low-lying
valleys and farmlands.
Despite the calamity and suffering inflicted upon all downwind populations during the
testing years, AEC administrators continued to deny their negligent roles for decades. Contrary
to overwhelming evidence of environmental degradation and human injury, the AEC publicly
maintained the pretense that its scientists were helping to better the world for American citizens.
In a September 1967 response to Margaret Marr Lambert’s letter of August 21, 1967, John A.
Harris, the Director of the AEC’s Division of Public Information, refuted Lambert’s assertion
that the “atomic energy program... may be exploited for ‘political and selfish commercial
reasons.’”237 Rather, he stated
I would like to assure you that this is not the case, just as it is not true that the atomic energy
program is being conducted at the expense of the general public’s health and safety or at the
risk of polluting or contaminating the environment in which we live.... It is quite true that
we don’t know all of the facts about radiation and its effects, nor do we understand all that
we do know.238
Harris pointed out that in twenty-five years of nuclear experiments knowledge had increased “to
the point where the use of atomic energy is very much a part of our daily lives.... I hope that I
have been able, to some degree, to overcome the concern expressed in your letter and to assure
you that the Atomic Energy Commission is conducting all of its activities in a manner that is
both safe and cognizant of the welfare and interests of the American people.”239 There is no
record of Lambert’s response, whether these further reassurances from the AEC propaganda
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machine were enough to assuage her fears completely. It is clear, however, that the
commission’s activities were detrimental to the natural environment to a degree which it was
unwilling to examine closely, and the political apparatus which purported to protect life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness for Americans failed to reign in the AEC’s experiments.

73

POLITICAL FALLOUT: THE DOWNWINDERS, AEC DUPLICITY, AND
CONGRESSIONAL FAILURE
“Clever people may learn as much as they wish of the results of science—still one will always
notice in their conversation, and especially in their hypotheses, that they lack the scientific
spirit.... To have an opinion means for them to fantacize [sic] for it and thenceforth to press it in
to their hearts as a conviction. If something is unexplained, they grow hot over the first notion
that comes into their heads and looks like an explanation—which results progressively in the
worst consequences, especially in the sphere of politics.”—Friedrich Nietzsche240
“Downwinders,” as the residents of communities impacted by fallout clouds from NTS
experiments have come to be known, pleaded with politicians at all levels of government for
relief from the injury raining down upon them from passing radiation clouds. By the time the
military had established NTS in 1951, the medical and military communities had more than half
a century of experience with the effects of radiation on both civilians and soldiers. However, a
sociopathic culture developed alongside the promise of ever-greater applications of nuclear
fission and fusion technologies, and this permeated the attitudes of AEC personnel during the
atmospheric testing years. The commission’s declarations of the importance of public safety in
their experiments became no more than lip-service paid to (initially) unsuspecting people with
revelations that the monitoring system which it eventually employed was an utter failure. The
AEC employed numerous propaganda campaigns, which began innocuously enough, in an effort
to combat hysteria and conspiracy theories, but the deceptive measures which the commission
developed ultimately reached astounding proportions with the support of respected congressional
representatives and scientific and medical professionals who had access to the facts supporting
the corrupted industry.
Scientists and medical professionals did not immediately understand the harmful effects
of nuclear radiation on the human body. After W. C. Roentgen’s discovery of x-rays in 1895,
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scientists began to associate radiation exposure with “burned skin, hair loss, and impaired
vision;”241 it was not until 1929 that “the American Medical Association passed a resolution
condemning the use of x-rays to remove body hair.”242 Marie Curie, who discovered radium in
1898, died in 1934 of leukemia caused by exposure to radium throughout her professional
career.243 While it was unknown at that time that a direct link existed between radium exposure
and cancer, harmful health effects as a result of exposure were well known. In addition to the
aforementioned work of Harrison Martland and the highly publicized death of radium promoter
Eben Byers, the case of the “Radium Girls” was well known to the scientific and medical
communities. These were female factory workers who labored as dial-painters in watch
factories, using paint containing radium which caused the watch faces to glow in darkness.
During the painting process, they ingested small amounts of radium which eventually led to
illness and death. Martland’s 1925 article established the scientific basis for ending the practice,
but corporations using radium-based paints concealed evidence of radium poisoning and hired a
group of “scientific consultants” who disagreed with Martland’s findings and placed the blame
for the factory workers’ illnesses on other causes.244 Their cases ultimately led the American
Medical Association to remove radium from a “list of remedies approved for internal
administration” in 1932.245
Government officials were responsible for perpetrating the most insidious of the radiation
experiments on its own citizens. Following the Trinity Shot in July 1945, Manhattan Project
(and later AEC) scientists began conducting experiments on patients at hospitals for the mentally
241
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ill. With the discovery of plutonium and its relative importance to nuclear explosions, scientists
began experiments to discover how much of the element was absorbed into the body, since they
did not fully understand many aspects of its associated dangers. These researchers administered
plutonium injections to eighteen patients from four hospitals from 1945-1947, only one of whom
signed a consent form. This was part of an exercise in helping “to calibrate body burdens,” and
the research team did not anticipate the treatments to yield any medical advantages for the
patients and intentionally conspired to ensure recipients did not discover the nature of the
experiments.246 Worst of all, the AEC “sponsored” several series of experiments on children at
the Walter E. Fernald State School in Waltham, Massachusetts, which served young boys with
developmental and mental disabilities. In 1946, and again from 1950-1953, scientists
administered radioactive tracers to the students, misleading parents into believing that the
injections had the potential to be medically beneficial, even though “the experiments were not
designed or expected to provide any health benefits to the subjects.”247
The Manhattan Project was not spared from exposure accidents during its development of
the bomb, though they seem to have been more incidental than deliberate in nature. Project
coordinators established exposure limits for employees based on the doses which the Advisory
Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection had established, although they actively encouraged
workers to avoid any degree of irradiation.248 These dose restrictions also formed the guidelines
for exposure limits used by the AEC upon its formation and takeover of nuclear experiment
operations. Following the Trinity Shot, researchers discovered “a radioactive ‘hot spot’... about
twenty-five miles from ground zero. This ‘hot spot’ was an area of high ground-level
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radioactivity completely surrounded by areas of much lower activity.”249 Less than one year
later, during a demonstration of a nuclear chain reaction at LASL, test director Alvin C. Graves
and seven other men received a high dose of acute radiation when the experiment went awry.
Dr. Louis Alexander Slotin, the scientist conducting the experiment, died nine days later, while
the other men and Graves “received a whole-body dose of nearly 400 roentgens” although they
received assurances from LASL director Norris E. Bradbury that it had been half that amount.250
This was not the only incident, and the subsequent scholarly articles detailing the incidents and
the effects of ionizing radiation on humans was well-documented and widely disseminated
throughout AEC ranks.251 Deceit with regard to actual dose incurred from AEC accidents was
not limited to those individuals who volitionally accepted the inherent risks associated with the
assignment.
The U.S. Advisory Committee on X-Ray and Radium Protection, founded in 1929,
reorganized in 1946 and took the name National Committee on Radiation Protection (NCRP).
Not long afterward, the committee made the decision to discard the term “tolerance dose” when
referring to the amount of radiation exposure considered to be harmful. Geneticists had shown
that any amount of radiation could adversely affect human reproductive cells and that mutant
genes which developed in a parent could be passed to offspring even if the parent had no
indication of having suffered “obvious radiation-induced injuries.”252 The NCRP adopted the
new term “maximum permissible dose” in order to acknowledge the concept that there was no
level of safe exposure to radioactive material. The new concept made unequivocal the
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committee’s belief that there was always some potential of experiencing injury from radiation
exposure below the allowable value.253
Within two months of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings of August 1945, American
and Japanese doctors were collaborating on the Joint Commission for the Investigation of the
Atomic Bomb in Japan in order to study the human health effects of the bombs. According to
Dr. James Nobuo Yamazaki, the U. S. government maintained the position that there were no or
“minimal” health effects resulting from radiation exposure, even though there were reports from
Australian and American reporters to the contrary.254 Yamazaki asserted that “the foremost
scientific concern at that time was the genetic effect... and that was the initial and primary
motivation to take a long-term study.”255 There was also a specific effort to study the effects on
children. Yamazaki maintained that “at first the focus was what was happening to a young child;
they knew that radiation had a stunting effect so they said to study how it’ll affect the growth and
development of a child.... Then it became obvious that the biochemical reactions of radiation
was [sic] indeed a toxic reaction.”256
The U. S. military still controlled the atomic weapons testing program when Operation
CROSSROADS commenced in June 1946 at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. Only two
shots occurred that summer, but they were potent enough to require the evacuation of inhabitants
of the islands. Yamazaki recounted that “all of the children under 10 [years of age] developed
some thyroid abnormalities, almost 100 percent. And the ones that developed the most serious
injury were those who were the youngest, say one years old, enough to... almost destroy the
253
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thyroid.”257 According to Yamazaki, scientists also discovered “thyroid abnormalities, and...
a[n] increased incidence of cancer of the thyroid” in adult Marshallese.258
By October 1946, understanding had advanced to the point that Colonel Stafford Warren,
the military officer heading radiological safety at Bikini that summer, gave a lecture to
radiological safety personnel regarding the dangers associated with their assignment. Col.
Warren warned that
you need only to absorb a few micrograms... to develop a progressive anemia or a tumor in
from 5 to 15 years. This is an insidious hazard and an insidious lethal effect hard to guard
against.... [Radioactive fallout would be] all around you,... you couldn’t eliminate it and it
would get on your clothes, in your house, in the water, in the milk, and all the food. It
would be in the dust and in the air you breathe. Filters couldn’t keep it out.... You get it on
your hands, you transfer it to your bread and jam, and you ingest it. You pile up the
amount—although it is not readily absorbed you gradually pile up increasing amounts.259
Two days later, Col. Warren sent a memorandum to Gen. Groves in which he was unequivocal in
his assertion that exposure to the smallest amount of radiation could have devastating health
effects years later. He claimed that a radioactive fragment from a bomb casing is
probably the most toxic metal known, and... extremely small amounts deposited in the
marrow will eventually cause progressive anemia and death years later. Tumor formation
has a high incidence.... [The material] mixed with these fission products, beta and gamma
emitters, is an insidious hazard—not immediately dangerous but if absorbed into the body it
produces a long time hazard.... The amount necessary to cause this hazard is minute—
measured in millionths of a gram. The harmful effects occur years later.... I believe a frank
statement of this sort should be made now to professional and intelligent lay groups as part
of the general discussion on the effect of the bomb as a whole.260
AEC officials, who had taken over nuclear weapons testing programs in August 1946, certainly
had access to this information and purposely withheld the facts from the general public,
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preferring instead to liken exposure to fallout with medical x-rays.261 Furthermore, eight years
later, Dunning claimed that there were not sufficient “vital statistics” or contaminated individuals
following an exposure from a March 1954 Marshall Islands shot to determine whether there
would be a “greater incidence of miscarriages and stillbirths” or stunted “growth and
development of the children.”262
This attitude pervaded the AEC throughout the atmospheric testing period. AEC officials
consistently adhered to their own cultural norm that what the public did not know could not
prevent the commission from carrying on with the development of more advanced and
destructive weapons. In fact, they believed that ignoring concerns or deceiving those who may
object was the only way to ensure continued funding for their experiments. They were definitely
knowledgeable of injuries associated with the historical abuses of x-rays and radium.263 The
AEC, being an association of extremely ambitious and authoritative military, scientific, and
industrial workers with their own distinctive mores, maintained an air of intellectual and
technologically-minded superiority. This led to an internal culture which fostered secrecy,
individual isolation, and institutional obedience; overconfidence in industrial technology and
alienation from human frailty; and ritualized participation in unleashing vast power while
performing the roles of demigods in a blossoming scientific field.264 As a result, the AEC, as
well as the laboratories and industries associated with its experiments, veiled their activities and
the human costs associated with them from both the American public and government
representatives in an effort to avert any restrictions which may be placed on their activities.265
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Meanwhile, studies continued to emanate from non-AEC affiliated sources warning of
the potential dangers associated with radiation exposure. A 1956 report of the National
Academy of Sciences indicated that any exposure to radioactive materials, no matter how small
the dose, had the likelihood of causing health problems in both individual instances and for large
segments of a population over an extended period of time. Furthermore, genetic mutations
would not necessarily appear immediately in individuals, but would dramatically increase the
risks for abnormalities in genetic development of forthcoming generations.266
In Washington County, AEC-issued reports frequently appeared in the weekly
publication of the Washington County News, lauding safety measures and emphasizing the
delight of scientists with the progress of their experiments. Two days after the conclusion of the
January-February 1951 RANGER series, an AEC announcement stressed the savings in
“manpower, materials, money, and above all, invaluable time in the national atomic energy
development program.”267 It further stated that AEC officials were entirely pleased with the
management and results of the initial NTS experiment series.268 By 1955, following numerous
accidents in prior operations, AEC officials were hedging their bets, announcing tests that were
low-yield in order to quell fears. The press release stated that the test series would help
“determine the safety of various weapons and experimental devices in the event of accidents...
during handling or storage.... It is possible that even very low scale detonations such as these
may release enough radioactive material into the air to affect very sensitive instruments or
processes of certain industries and research institutions.”269 Again in April 1957, the press
release claimed that the AEC would utilize NTS for “experiments related to the safety of atomic
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weapons during handling and storage.... There will be no nuclear detonation.”270 So concerned
were AEC officials about public outcry that they intentionally deceived nearby residents
regarding the perception that residents’ health may be adversely affected from fallout and
emphasized experiments which they knew would produce no measurable radiation.271 According
to Eugene Bridges, the AEC and supportive politicians “were totally committed and they were
not going to let anything interfere with the continuance of that testing.”272
Despite the culture within the AEC, administrators very early recognized the necessity of
maintaining positive public opinion. In addition to reaffirming constantly its commitment to
public safety in all press releases, AEC officials were quick to point out the value of such
experiments to maintain global stability. The theory seems to have been that the public would
accept the AEC’s safety assertions if the agency sufficiently emphasized the importance of the
tests to stave off Soviet advances.273 Still, the AEC did not miss an opportunity to point out the
high importance placed on considerations of public safety, and Dunning was the most adamant
spokesperson to this end. According to him, “the health and safety of persons was the major
consideration in the original selection of the Nevada Test Site and this continues to be of
paramount importance during the conduct of nuclear tests.”274 He went on to state that the
paucity of inhabited land in the region offered “optimum conditions for maintenance of safety”
and that on the “few occasions when persons have been asked to remain indoors for a few hours
to reduce the radiation dose... the out-of-door exposure would have been far from hazardous.”275
He also lauded the AEC’s multi-field Advisory Panel, comprised of representatives from the
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fields of “public health, medicine, meteorology, fallout phenomenology, blast and thermal
effects,” for considering “carefully all of the factors that insured safety” prior to each
detonation.276 The outcomes of their deliberations were that “more than 200 delays in firing
have been made at a cost of millions of dollars, to insure safety.”277 In addition to these
expenditures, by 1964 the NTS budget for “operational and research studies directed toward
safety at the Nevada Test Site” was $8 million.278
The AEC’s public relations efforts were multi-faceted during the atmospheric testing
period. It is hard to imagine that more energy and resources were devoted to any other single
aspect of its operations. The commission had to juggle its mandate to develop and test new
weapons with the requirement that it also establish and adhere to new safety standards for
radiation exposure. It regularly cited its impeccable safety record, distorted its importance in
maintaining national security, and made fallacious arguments about the threat of Soviet
aggression. Further, scientists made specious arguments regarding the effect of naturallyoccurring background radiation, while receiving a pass from the media and government
representatives who regularly deferred to AEC expertise when reporting on the commission’s
activities or answering citizens’ concerns. Finally, the AEC devoted large sums of money to
promoting its activities through print, film, and educational propaganda in local newspapers,
community gathering places, and primary schools in nearby communities, while partnering with
the Federal Civil Defense Administration (Civil Defense) to promote its agenda and deflect
attention and fears about nuclear weapons toward Soviet attacks. Given that the American
public had high hopes for the potential of nuclear energy to have a positive impact on the world,

276

Ibid., pp. 33-34.
Ibid., p. 34.
278
Ibid., p. 43.
277

83

it is likely that they would have agreed with the need to persevere in the testing projects if they
had been properly educated in protective measures.279
AEC propaganda was present from the founding of NTS, as officials used the term
“atomic energy program” as often as possible when referring to the weapons testing program,
emphasizing the beneficial potential for a civilian program over the malignance of devastating
bombs. When the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 formed the AEC, it also assigned the commission
the primary tasks of producing the uranium and plutonium supplies for the bomb cores, as well
as the research, development, and experimentation for innovative bomb designs.280 The creation
of NTS in 1951 implicitly placed responsibility for public safety in AEC hands, although it was
not until the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that this was made explicit.281 There was, from the
outset, tension between the explicit and implicit objectives, and the requirement of reporting to
the Joint Commission on Atomic Energy and its control of AEC funding made nuclear regulation
a political issue which could be bartered.282 Paul Jacobs, a journalist and activist, pointed out in
a 1957 article that “following the fundamental pattern of our government, the responsibility for
weapons development should be separated from that of guarding public health.”283
LASL personnel had the principal responsibility within the AEC of assessing both
“weapons effectiveness and offsite radiation hazards.”284 In court at the Allen trial, its director,
Norris Bradbury, scoffed “‘sure there are a few people with leukemia. More people get killed in
automobile accidents every hour than will die of leukemia.’”285 Bradbury’s hyperbolic statement
ignored the fact that people volitionally get into automobiles and assume the risk associated with
279
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doing so, whereas they had no agency to choose exposure to cancer-causing radioactive fallout.
His LASL released a report in 1950 which stated that fallout reaching the earth’s surface “in
appreciable amounts... may represent a serious physiological hazard.”286 The real threat,
according to this report, was that an enemy could use radiation from nuclear weapons tactically
in order to render “certain areas uninhabitable.”287 It went on to emphasize the variations from
individual to individual of “the susceptibility to radiation” when considering levels above “the
tolerance doses,” a measure which the NCRP had abandoned four years earlier.288 LASL
scientists recommended that “statistical averages must be used for practical purposes.”289 While
this may have been appropriate for certain studies, the average used was for the entire U. S.
population and did not include a separate calculation for those citizens living within certain
proximate distances from the test site. Seven years later, the AEC was still claiming it was
conducting ongoing studies in relation to human health effects and touting its cautionary
practices by postponing for two weeks experiments in order “to avoid unfavorable fallout on
communities around the test site.”290 The AEC intended that these declarations would placate
local citizens.
AEC media reports regularly mixed in a healthy dose of national security rhetoric with its
claims of placing priority on public safety. Public relations efforts in the downwind region
accelerated drastically in 1955, after a year-long hiatus from experiments at NTS resulting from
the disasters and scares of the 1953 series, including Shots Simon and Harry. A 1955 pamphlet
the AEC distributed in downwind communities claimed that downwinders were “in a very real
sense active participants” in the weapons testing experiments, “which have contributed greatly to
286
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building the defenses of our own country and of the free world.”291 Distributed ahead of
Operation TEAPOT, the pamphlet further stated that “each shot is justified by national and
international security need and that none will be fired unless there is adequate assurance of
public safety.”292 The citizens’ sense of pride and contribution was further stroked by the claims
that despite the fact that “some of you have been exposed to potential risk from flash, blast, or
fall-out... you have accepted the inconvenience or the risk without fuss, without alarm, and
without panic... [which] has helped achieve an unusual record of safety.”293
While this may have helped to pacify downwind residents, some editors of the nation’s
major publications remained unconvinced. Nora Lyman reported that at a 1957 press conference
held by “a group of American editors,” they expressed concern over the announcement of
penalties for the media which could prevent them from publishing information critical to
ensuring that the American citizenry could make informed decisions about how the government
should proceed.294 In the article, Lyman quoted Vermont C. Royster, senior associate editor of
the Wall Street Journal, who asserted that if the media was not free to report the all of the
relevant information, the “‘doors sealed by the rubber stamps will hide the facts from all of us.
None of us will ever know what dark secrets are hidden behind those doors.’”295 Lyman claimed
that “it was pointed out that once the government had this authority, any information it did not
wish made public could be ‘classified’ in the name of ‘national security.’”296
Not wanting to miss an opportunity to pat themselves on their backs, AEC officials often
pointed to an established safety record in their public press releases as a means to justify the
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commission’s continued existence. The aforementioned AEC pamphlet heralded its record that
“no one inside Nevada test site has been injured” and “no one outside the test site in the nearby
region of potential exposure has been hurt” through the first thirty-one nuclear explosions at
NTS.297 According to the document, the only casualties had been “some cattle and horses
grazing within a few miles of the detonations [which] suffered skin deep radiation burns, but the
damage had no effect on their breeding value nor the beef quality of the cattle.”298 It explicitly
denied the potential of ingestion exposure for the cattle and people who may consume them, but
the AEC had still not publicly acknowledged this threat.
Under the section describing the upcoming TEAPOT series and procedural changes to the
monitoring system, the AEC lauded the “considerable improvement” in safety measures by
which it “expected to provide not only continued assurance of public safety but also... to reduce
public exposure to a minimum.”299 This begs the question whether what the AEC had been
promising nearby residents during previous testing series was ever actualized, since minimum
exposure was, presumably, already a norm. The public’s role was not diminished, however, as
“the potential exposure of the public will be low and... can be reduced still further by continued
public cooperation.”300 When a test shot occurred that did not result in any public concern, the
AEC was quick to hold it up as a shining example, as in the case of Shot Zucchini of May 15,
1955: away from “the test site and the gunnery range all readings reported in populated
communities were quite light, the heaviest being at Moapa, Nev., (estimated population 150)
persons) where .68 roentgens was recorded.”301 In dealing with congressional representatives
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from the affected downwind communities, AEC officials always maintained the same assertions:
“the Atomic Energy Commission constantly endeavors to minimize the amounts of atmospheric
contamination from nuclear explosions. Further, we endeavor to keep the public fully informed
on any biological dangers from radioactive contamination.”302
Perhaps the favorite public relations tool at the AEC’s disposal was the threat of an attack
by the USSR. Early in the testing period, the AEC claimed that its weapons would deter the
Soviets from attacking Americans on their home soil, but after their successful test of a
thermonuclear hydrogen bomb in 1953, rhetoric turned to the imminent threat a Soviet bomb
posed. It is not a coincidence that this escalation also occurred after the mishaps of the AEC’s
UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE series in 1953. For the AEC’s purposes, “America is the one country
standing in the way of Russia’s control of the world, and as long as it is a threat to the Soviet
Union there is the danger of an all-out war.”303
While it is true that all three branches of government were involved in creating a national
sense of fear of Communist infiltration, which led to the creation of the Civil Defense
Administration, the AEC was able to harness public fear for its own purposes and survival most
effectively.304 By teaming with Civil Defense, the AEC could deflect attention and concern from
its testing program, which was a far closer but less insidious threat (or so they claimed).
Numerous public relations pamphlets distributed by Civil Defense claimed that harmful fallout
was a phenomenon of the explosion of a hydrogen bomb, implying that fallout is not hazardous
if emanating from a standard atomic bomb like those detonated at NTS.305 Lending credibility to
the AEC’s claims that “only when radioactivity is present in large amounts does it become
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dangerous” and “hydrogen bomb explosions create large amounts of radioactive fallout,” were
reports that the Soviets were detonating extremely large hydrogen bombs which were
contaminating the western U. S. as a result of prevailing winds.306 A 1959 Civil Defense
pamphlet warned that “alpha and beta particles may be dangerous if they are ingested through
contaminated food, water, or air, but they have low penetrating power.”307 The AEC had been
aware of this for years but chose not to disseminate the information, instead leaving it to Civil
Defense to present the facts in a manner which would lead people to believe the information was
provided to protect them from an attack rather than the negligence of their own government’s
agency.308
AEC scientists frequently turned to the presence of naturally-occurring background
radiation when attempting to assuage public fears and debunk the claims of non-AEC scientific
studies. AEC sources noted that, while mutations in the body’s cellular composition as a result
of radiation did occur, these “changes... occur spontaneously under normal and natural
conditions in all kinds of animals and plants. Normal radiation background is one factor in this
process.”309 The AEC’s scientific assertion was that “radiation from fall-out from Nevada tests
would have no greater effect on the human heredity process in the United States than would
natural radiation in those parts of the Nation where normal levels are high.”310 What the
commission neglected to address was how much more the release of radiation from NTS would
contribute to normal background radiation, especially when combined with the U. S. hydrogen
bomb tests in the Pacific and Soviet experiments, all of which were releasing large amounts of
radiation.
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Beyond these statements, AEC arguments for the natural existence of radiation became
ridiculous at best; completely disingenuous at worst. The non sequitur that most people are
unable to “explain electricity, although we have learned to live with it and to use it,” therefore
nuclear radiation can be safely utilized, was frequently used when facing angry citizens.311 Also
popular as an AEC explanation was the proposition that people “willingly expose [them]selves to
much heavier radiation when [they] undergo diagnostic X-rays.”312 Dunning also provided
sleight-of-hand scientific analysis when he claimed that “fallout has not introduced a new and
strange agent into our environment with completely unpredictable results.”313 He continued by
stating that “to these levels of radiation exposures are now added those from fallout—but these
radiations (gamma rays and beta particles) are no different in kind from those emanating from
natural sources. Nor is there any evidence that they produce any fundamentally different
biological effects.”314
Whether deliberately or through ignorance, media outlets and congressional
representatives often repeated AEC reassurances verbatim and thus were complicit in the AEC’s
deceptions. At the conclusion of the RANGER series, the WCN reprinted directly the AEC press
release which claimed that “‘Reports received from field survey patrols have shown no
indication of any radiological hazards.’”315 If the media questioned the commission’s directors
on whether there was satisfactory off-site monitoring, it went unreported.316 Again repeating an
AEC release word for word ahead of the TEAPOT series in 1955, the local paper reported that
danger existed only “for persons on-site,” but that off-site observers should take precautions
311
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since “the flash of light... can cause temporary eye damage under some circumstances.”317 It
also stated that “radioactive exposure levels within the bombing range could be hazardous,”
implying that no danger existed from radiation for persons outside the boundaries of NTS.318 In
an effort to reassure Washington County’s residents, the AEC invited “the mayors of Hurricane,
Washington, St. George, and Santa Clara and the director of civil defense in Washington county
[sic]... to witness the atomic bomb explosion near a typical townsite prepared on the Nevada
proving grounds April 26.”319 It is unclear whether they were able to attend, as there is no record
of a test shot occurring on April 26.
Douglas R. Stringfellow, one of Utah’s U. S. House Representatives (1953-1955), had
questioned the effects of weapons testing following shot Harry in May 1953, declaring that he
would investigate on behalf of “alarmed” constituents. After visiting NTS to observe a test shot
on May 25, 1953 (six days after Harry and at the AEC’s personal invitation), Stringfellow
retracted his earlier skepticism and announced that the AEC was making every effort to protect
downwinders from unnecessary exposure.320 Following this observation, Stringfellow informed
AEC chairman Lewis Lichtenstein Strauss that he had given
several speeches and radio broadcasts in my district and also issued press releases in which I
reassured the people of Utah that every precautionary measure was being taken to protect
their health and welfare. I also attempted to allay their fears and reassure them that the
degree of radiation from atomic fallout was so low that it could not have any adverse effect
on their physical well-being.321
William Adams Dawson, who served with Stringfellow in the U. S. House (1947-1949,
1953-1959), wrote to a senior case worker for the Utah County Department of Public Welfare in
Provo, Utah, that he would not back a federal bill for cancer research funding since “the Federal
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Government through the Atomic Energy Program and through the National Science Foundation
is at the present time making a sizeable contribution to cancer research.... This, of course, would
create a new Federal bureau which is in itself wasteful. It would also have the effect of placing
the entire burden of cancer research on the Government.”322 In 1957, he responded to a letter
from a concerned citizen of the Salt Lake City area, acknowledging “disagreements among the
experts on the effect of fall-out,” but claimed that the “differences are of degree, not of kind, so
that a pretty reliable range of values can be established.”323 He cited the AEC’s statistic that
“1,500 to 9,000 children (of the two billion [born in the next generation worldwide]... will bear
detectable defects owing to fall-out,” then asserted that, while he did not claim expertise, he did
“believe that those tests are being conducted by competent and conscientious men who would
not take unreasonable chances with our future generations.”324 Apparently he was blissful in his
ignorance, as there is no evidence that he undertook any investigation as to the veracity of this
claim.
Utah’s U. S. Senators also engaged with their constituency during this period on the
effects of radioactive fallout. Wallace Foster Bennett (served 1951-1975), one of the members
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and vice-chairman of the Ethics committee, replied to
a St. George high school principal in 1957 that there was not “any subject in which there is more
emotion and less real knowledge than in this question: ‘What are the possible effects of atomic
and nuclear explosions?’”325 His ethics work seems to have failed Bennett in this instance, since
as a member of the JCAE he would have had access to classified scientific studies. Bennett
322

William Adams Dawson, Papers, J. Willard Mariott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, to Bessie I.
Meiling, August 10, 1953, Dawson MS, Box 21, Folder 23.
323
Dawson to Mrs. Albert L. Anderson, September 10, 1957, Dawson MS, Box 7, Folder 15.
324
Ibid.
325
Wallace Foster Bennett, Papers, J. Willard Mariott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, to Newell R.
Frei (Principal, Woodward High School, St. George), May 23, 1957 (dictated May 17), Bennett MS, Box 8, Folder
4.

92

continued, claiming that the testing could not be eliminated since it offered “the only way to
know [we] have created a weapon of a special type.”326 He also claimed that the Department of
Defense would not relocate the experiments because “they have spent large sums of money in
equipping the area with the necessary precautions and with the equipment needed to make the
tests, and I am sure there are no justifications for abandoning this area, especially since they
spent lots of time selecting the best site in the first place.”327 He concluded by professing his
“personal impression that the damage of current and future tests will be less than those of some
other tests in the past.”328
Senator Frank Moss was by far the most sensitive to the concerns of Utahns regarding the
nearby testing, yet he tended to waver in the face of political pressure from his congressional
colleagues and the AEC. However, he did not take office until 1959, and it would be unfair to
assert that he possessed adequate political influence to make necessary changes during the
atmospheric testing years. While he may have “seemed very much aware of the dangers to our
children and to the unborn generations which have been created by the nuclear tests already
completed,” Moss maintained that “explanations are no substitute for action that will help
remove the threat of nuclear war.”329 Behind his office door, however, he undertook to pressure
the AEC. In a 1963 letter to AEC chairman Glenn Seaborg, Moss noted the “very heavy
contamination in parts of Utah from nuclear explosions” which resulted in calls “for intensified
study of the health of children and others who live in the area.”330 Moss fully endorsed these
proposed measures, stating his conviction “that we should arm ourselves with all the information
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possible on the results of nuclear fallout,” and asked for future tests to be restricted to nongrazing seasons.331 Seaborg responded to Moss’s letter by asserting that “we have no evidence
that the levels of radioactivity resulting from the Commission’s testing activities at the Nevada
Test Site have been the cause of any thyroid cancer or leukemia in any individual,” but noted that
the AEC had requested the U.S. Public Health Service “to undertake studies in the Utah/Nevada
area on thyroid cancer cases.”332 Seaborg also averred that restricting testing to winter months
would likely eliminate I-131 in milk, but claimed that this “could place unacceptable restrictions
on the conduct of important tests.”333 Despite his position in this instance, Moss maintained a
posturing stance to his constituents rather than attempting to build a coalition to oppose the AEC.
A likely reason that there was not greater public outcry during the early testing years is
that the AEC began producing numerous pieces of propaganda for distribution among downwind
communities early on, but drastically increased these efforts following the mishaps of the Spring
1953 test series. Although the AEC had moved all atmospheric tests to the Marshall Islands for
1954, by March of that year officials were distributing films to Civil Defense offices for public
viewings. Washington County Civil Defense director LeRoy Bailey showed the films
“Operation Crossroads” and “The Evacuation of Civilians” to various public groups in St.
George, with the promise that other towns in Washington County would also have an
opportunity to view them in their locales.334 In its Atomic Test Effects pamphlet the following
year, the AEC wanted no ambiguity in the public’s understanding of its programs. It implored
citizens to “understand that we are not talking about high yield A-bombs or H-bombs tested
elsewhere. We are not discussing radiation from enemy bombs designed to do the most damage
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possible. We are talking only about low-yield tests, conducted under controlled conditions at the
Nevada Test Site.”335 The commission attempted to boost morale in Washington County with a
new film, released in St. George toward the end of the TEAPOT series:
Atomic ‘fallout’ in the St. George area about one year ago particularly when everyone was
requested to stay indoors for almost two hours, caused so much concern that the AEC not
only investigated carefully, but decided to make a film of the incident, incorporating some
of the tests and other features as well. This week the picture, in Technicolor and showing
St. George streets and residents, is having its premiere here and was shown in the chamber
meeting.336
Lyman remarked in her “Observations” column the following week that the film would no doubt
“travel all over the nation, and many of our former Dixieites will no doubt see it, and I venture a
momentary pang of homesickness will possess them as they see our streets and the everyday
activities going along.”337
The “peaceful” uses for atomic energy were also extolled. Standard Oil Company
featured a full-page advertisement in the WCN in August 1956 which claimed that its close
collaboration with the AEC was producing results in discovering “lubricants for atomic
machinery able to withstand withering radiation... [which would] speed the day when
commercial atomic power will help drive planes and ships, and generate electricity for your
home.”338 One year later, the AEC launched a travelling “Atoms for Peace” exhibit, which it
claimed would provide “a comprehensive picture of the ways in which the peaceful atom is
playing an important role in everyday life.... There is no admission charge—every resident of
Washington county [sic] is invited to visit the exhibit for an informative glimpse of the peaceful
atom.”339
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While they may have been endangering adults and children of all ages, AEC officials did
not neglect secondary school students in their indoctrination schemes. The Office of Civil and
Defense Mobilization reported that 15,000 high schools nationwide would be receiving
radiological kits by September 1958. It announced that with “the cooperation of the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare and the State Education Departments, science teachers in
these schools are conducting instruction in radiological defense topics in connection with science
courses. One million students will receive such instruction by June 1959.”340 Shortly after the
atmospheric testing period ended, the director of the AEC’s Division of Technical Information,
Edward J. Brunenkant, wrote David Sjodahl King, Utah’s U. S. Representative (1959-1963,
1965-1967) to inform him that
The Atomic Energy Commission has for several years sponsored lecture demonstration
programs to acquaint secondary school students and their teachers with the basic principles
and the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. In this activity, AEC-trained lecturers
provide a basic introduction to the subject at student assemblies, utilizing colorful
demonstration equipment. At most schools they meet also with selected science classes to
help the teachers familiarize their students with specific aspects of nuclear science.341
The Civil Defense program received greater emphasis in Washington County beginning
in 1954, if frequency of WCN articles is an accurate indicator. The local division of the
volunteer agency was showing Civil Defense films that spring in order “to make the residents of
Washington county aware of the importance and significance of this nationwide project.”342 By
1956, links to the AEC experiments became more prominent, as one article claimed that “fallout
is now one of the principal nuclear dangers with which civil defense must contend. Civilians
will be told to seek shelter in basements, ‘cyclone’ shelters and the like if fallout from a nuclear
340
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explosion is heading their way;” the implication here is that it would be fallout from a Soviet
attack.343 The focus had turned to a Soviet hydrogen bomb attack, in which case Civil Defense
would work “to assure survival of the greatest number of persons if some day an American sky
lights up like a hundred suns.”344 Civil Defense members also stressed that “the most important
people for civilian defense are those in the rural areas, such as Washington county [sic], who
would be the actual survivors in the event of bombings of our country.”345 As well, they warned
that windblown fallout from a high-yield “bomb on the west coast could be deadly in
Washington county [sic].... America is the one country standing in the way of Russia’s control
of the world, and as long as it is a threat to the Soviet Union there is the danger of an all-out
war.”346
Speculation of the AEC’s manipulation of information is corroborated by its own internal
documentation, some of which survived Department of Energy destruction. A 1948 AEC staff
report, entitled “Location of Proving Ground for Atomic Weapons,” stated the belief that “‘a
properly conducted public information program stressing radiological safety factors as a result of
prevailing winds could overcome adverse public reaction’” on a large scale, while nullifying
localized opposition by questioning patriotism and suggesting Communist sympathies.347
Gordon Dean, AEC chairman when NTS was founded, held himself to a strict policy of only
divulging information to direct questions and even then providing answers which left the issue
“‘completely fuzzed up.’”348 In the spring of 1953, the AEC provided advance warnings of
possible fallout to the National Association of Photographic Manufacturers, but not to the
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downwind population.349 By March 1953, there was no admission in the AEC’s publicly
disseminated information pamphlets that the potential of cancer development existed many years
after exposure, although there was a plethora of extant and accumulating evidence from
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.350 This is corroborated by the interview with James Yamazaki.
Additionally, the AEC continued to present publicly the threshold theory of harmful
radiation, claiming that people suffer injury from radiation exposure “only if too many cells are
damaged or destroyed at one time, or are destroyed continuously in certain organs of the body
over a long period of time.”351 What scientists knew but did not admit was that this only applied
to immediately observable maladies, and they ignored the long-term health consequences of
exposure to the smallest amounts of radiation. The next section contained outright deception, as
it claimed that the human body is capable of receiving “considerably greater doses of radiation
[above normal-background] because the effects are repaired almost as rapidly as they are
produced. Over a period of many years, a human may safely receive in small doses a total
amount of radiation which would cause fatal illness if administered to his whole body within a
period of a few minutes.”352
The focus on misrepresenting the dangers of the AEC’s experiments exacerbated
problems with the offsite monitoring procedures. The AEC did not make necessary adjustments
to its monitoring of downwind communities because its officials were concerned that increasing
its presence in these areas would result in heightened public and political scrutiny of the
necessity of operating a continental test site. The National Research Council’s I-131 study found
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that “the exposure of the public was inadequately monitored,” despite the many assertions the
AEC made to the contrary.353 At the beginning of the RANGER series, the AEC prohibited
flights over the test site and, by the end of the year, placed restrictions on “all aircraft entering or
operating within a 200-mile radius from Las Vegas,” although ground monitoring did not extend
more than a few miles offsite.354 By 1953, the AEC had extended the range of monitors, but they
still only operated along highways and major unpaved roads, while receiving procedural
directions in the field which limited their practical effectiveness. These monitors also often
treated their responsibilities lightly. AEC officials and Public Health and Safety monitors joked
years later that they were convincing downwind residents through public relations efforts that
they were safe while the AEC was exposing off-site residents to radiation.355 The AEC’s Atomic
Test Effects pamphlet directed downwind residents “to open windows and doors to equalize
pressure” inside their homes in order to mitigate the force of the blast from detonations.356 There
were no instructions to then reseal the home so that wind-blown radioactive dust would not enter
the home as easily.
One complication resulting from the limited monitoring system was the inability of field
monitors and aerial surveys to detect radioactive hot spots, “localized areas of enhanced fallout
deposition that would be of radiological concern.”357 These hot spots were of particular concern
to Washington County since it is such a large area and residents during the period could remain
in remote areas away from population centers for extended periods of time. Later studies
showed that people coming into contact with hot spots may have experienced radiation exposure
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levels which were “thousands or millions of times greater than average levels.”358 Rural
residents and residents of the smaller hamlets in Washington County were particularly
susceptible, since the AEC often neglected to warn them of the impending danger even though
these areas often experienced heavier fallout levels than in St. George.359 In Gunlock, the local
teacher reportedly had “no recollection of ever being told to keep indoors the dozen children who
attended the one-room schoolhouse. Neither she nor the owner of the general store recalls ever
seeing any monitors in or around Gunlock during the Upshot-Knothole tests of 1953.”360 Also,
because rainfall is a precious occurrence in desert environs, thunderstorms in the area presented a
serious threat because rain showers occurring in conjunction with passing radioactive clouds
dramatically increase the prevalence of radioactive hot spots.361
Even if monitors had notified all rural residents and detected all hot spots, it is likely the
AEC would not have admitted to any existing danger. AEC pamphlets repeatedly diminished the
potential dangers of fallout, likening burns from radioactive beta particles to “burns produced by
heat, except that they appear only after one or two weeks and heal slowly and more imperfectly...
barely penetrate the skin and produce no other damage to the body.”362 When winds began to
carry radioactive clouds toward the observation stations miles away during a 1957 shot, officials
immediately ordered the withdrawal of “several hundred scientists and observers,” although,
according to later AEC reports, the clouds carried “‘only very light fallout’” and “there would
have been no danger had the people remained.”363 Later studies determined that while “the
official limit was 3.9 rads per year for the public downwind of the atmospheric tests... action
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tended not to be taken until doses reached or exceeded the level at which immediate radiation
symptoms became manifest.”364 During the ‘Dirty Harry’ Shot, the AEC told people that the
radiation level was not dangerous because there were no immediately observable indicators.365
This was a distinct “example of how public education became so mixed up with public relations
that the official goal of safety was largely subverted.”366
When dealing with public safety concerns, the AEC employed several methods, generally
according to which source was raising questions. At times, officials would attempt to discredit
scientific studies which questioned the genetic and health effects of low-level radiation exposure,
claiming the researchers had manipulated the results as a result of having been biased.367 At
other times, the AEC withheld pertinent information by having documents classified due to the
presence of “military information,” often citing matters of national security to shield its nonsecurity-related practices.368 More often, the AEC exerted its considerable influence to ensure
that medical research went unpublished or to keep local health practitioners from speaking about
the associated dangers, thereby preventing mass panic in communities which had begun to speak
openly about radiation dangers.369 When dealing with inquiries from Utah’s politicians, the
favored practice of AEC officials was to send standardized form letters reiterating the necessity
of the experiments to national security and always with some version of the caveat that “all
precautions were taken in the Nevada tests to keep off-site radiation to a minimum. The addition
to worldwide fallout would be negligible.”370 For citizens, the message remained unchanged
(except in the case of a Soviet attack): “Your best action is not to be worried about fall-out.... If
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you think that maybe you have been in fall-out, or if you have other questions, get in touch with
our monitors or with the Test Organization. Your questions will be answered.”371
Washington County residents did not have their questions answered accurately though,
and given the degree of contamination and the problems associated with decontamination, their
exposure became exponentially worse. LASL had published its findings relative to
decontamination procedures in 1950 in a book prepared for and in cooperation with the
Department of Energy and the AEC. It stated that there were no means by which to “neutralize
the radioactivity;” it was only possible to “transfer the active material from one place to
another.”372 In order to make a contaminated area “habitable within a reasonable time,” all
“loose material which might form dust that would be inhaled or ingested with food” would need
to be disposed of or covered up.373 Rooftops would present a significant challenge, since they
“would collect considerable amounts of radioactive material, but could not be easily
decontaminated.”374 Decontaminating soil would also be extremely problematic, as “the
radioactivity will remain in the uppermost few inches.”375 The suggested solution to the
quandary was “to remove it or cover it with at least a foot of fresh soil.”376 Additionally,
“clothing, as well as rugs, curtains, and upholstered furniture” which had been contaminated
“would have to be discarded and buried or burned in proper incinerators designed to prevent the
escape of radioactive smoke.”377 Washington County’s citizens never received these warnings or
decontamination procedures from AEC officials who were concerned that public dissemination
of these facts would spark an enormous public outcry.
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A few high-profile individuals, including politicians, scientists and activists, did speak
out against the weapons testing program. The press and the constituency of a Nevada state
legislator who called for an end to detonations at NTS excoriated him publicly; the state bill
which he had introduced died while still in committee.378 Senator Edward Lewis Bartlett (DAlaska, 1959-1968) gave a speech on the Senate floor in 1963 in which he outlined the plethora
of issues facing his Alaskan constituents, as well as Americans in general. Entitled “Fallout
Monitoring: We Must Do Better: We Could Hardly Do Worse,” Bartlett’s speech quoted a 1962
United Nations report which asserted that
It is clearly established that exposure to radiation, even in doses substantially lower than
those producing acute effects, may occasionally give rise to a wide variety of harmful effects
including cancer, leukemia and inherited abnormalities which in some cases may not be
easily distinguishable from naturally occurring conditions or identifiable as due to radiation.
Because of the available evidence that genetic damage occurs at the lowest levels as yet
experimentally tested, it is prudent to assume that some genetic damage may follow any
dose of radiation, however small.379
He claimed that the AEC’s “radiation surveillance and control program is no more than an
ineffective gesture,” and called on the president “to stop treating radiation as once we treated
cancer. It exists, it threatens us. It must not be hidden away as cancer once was.”380
American scientist Linus Carl Pauling, instrumental in proving that strontium-90 from
atmospheric tests in cow’s milk was a significant public health threat, calculated in 1957 that
fallout-induced leukemia was responsible for a minimum of ten thousand American casualties.381
Rachel Louise Carson, an American marine biologist and preservationist, admitted to the
presence of natural background radiation in her 1962 work, Silent Spring, but pointed out that
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living organisms had “millennia” to adapt to relatively constant levels of background radiation,
whereas the rapid introduction into the atmosphere of new and increased levels of radiation
destabilized the delicate balance which had been achieved over eons.382 German physician Dr.
Albert Schweitzer, who politicians frequently misquoted or whose quotations they often repeated
out of context, stated in 1957 that
we are forced to regard every increase in the existing danger through further creation of
radioactive elements by atom bomb explosions as a catastrophe for the human race, a
catastrophe that must be prevented under every circumstance.... The end of further
experiments with atom bombs would be like the early sun rays of hope which suffering
humanity is longing for.383
Schweitzer’s statement, that “even today, we must concede to each nation the right to stand
ready to defend itself with the terrible weapons now at its disposal,” which American politicians
most often used to justify and defend the weapons testing program, went on to implore that
humans needed “to take the first step along this new highway [of peaceful existence]. Not one of
them will lose a fraction of the power necessary for their own defense.”384
The evidence of AEC negligence and deception is overwhelming. In the years of
atmospheric testing, “105 tests were conducted above ground surface at NTS and 14 other tests
were at depths where containment was not expected. The total nuclear yield of these detonations
was approximately one megaton of TNT-equivalent explosive energy,” the same as an early
hydrogen bomb being dropped on Nevada.385 While it is true that this was less concentrated over
a thirteen-year period than a single hydrogen weapon detonation, one must also consider that
because of variable winds the multiple detonations scattered fallout over a much greater area
382
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than that of a single detonation. Speaking to the JCAE in 1959 of the devastating results of the
AEC’s experiments, Dr. Charles C. Price of the University of Pennsylvania claimed that AEC
researchers acceded that radiation exposures below the maximum permissible dose were not
harmless. He continued his passionate speech by questioning the AEC’s integrity:
Do the AEC scientists believe 100,000 additional cases of leukemia a year are permissible?
Or is it only 10,000 cases a year? How many additional deformed children per year do they
consider permissible?... It is not clear and obvious to the general public, nor even to
scientists, which deformed children or which leukemia cases were the result of bomb testing
rather than natural or other causes. It is therefore extremely important that the public be
informed of and be willing to accept the degree of hazard which the AEC calls
‘permissible.’... It seems extremely dangerous and undesirable to have the definition of
what is ‘permissible’ so completely lodged with the AEC. It has been demonstrated in many
serious instances that this agency is indeed capable of suppressing important information
detrimental to its interests and of distorting news so as to mislead the public.386
Undeterred, AEC officials continued their deceptive practices and policy of suppressing
accurate information. Douglas Grahn, a geneticist in the AEC’s Division of Biology and
Medicine, testified before the JCAE that “it can be assumed that a series of short duration high
intensity exposures, even to low total doses,” would pose serious health risks.387 In certain
instances though, high intensity exposures led to high total doses. A 1962 AEC report found
that, following Shot Harry in 1953, St. George children “may have received doses to the thyroid
of radioiodine as high as 120 to 440 rads,” far exceeding the limits proposed and allegedly
upheld by the AEC.388 Even after the “scientific consensus” he claimed existed had been
debunked years earlier; even after his own colleagues within the AEC produced evidence that
residents, including children, had received exposures well in excess of the maximum permissible
386

“Statement Concerning Fallout by Charles C. Price,” University of Pennsylvania, in United States, Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, Fallout from Nuclear Weapons Tests: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on
Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st sess., May 5-8, 1959, vol. 3, pp. 2270-2271.
387
“Radiation Induced Life Shortening and Associated Effects,” by Douglas Grahn, Geneticist, Division of Biology
and Medicine, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, in United States, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Fallout from
Nuclear Weapons Tests: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, 86th Cong., 1st sess., May 5-8, 1959, vol. 1, p. 97.
388
Pat Ortmeyer and Arjun Makhijani, “Worse Than We Knew,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 53, no. 6
(November/December 1997): 49.

105

dose limit, Dr. Gordon Dunning continued to maintain that “only a few individuals have
exceeded by small amounts the criterion of 10 roentgens in 10 years established for the Nevada
Test Site.”389 The AEC deliberately manipulated records it released to the public,
underestimated exposure levels, produced inaccurate fallout maps, and made a mockery of
legitimate offsite monitoring procedures. Furthermore, according to a 1980 Federal Government
report, the accuracy of the monitoring instruments themselves may have been off by as much as
30%.”390 In 1991, the IPPNW reported it had found sufficient
evidence that conscious decisions were made to accept harm to people and to the
environment in the pursuit of larger and more deadly nuclear arsenals. The need for military
secrecy was inappropriately used to conceal information vital to protecting the public health.
The report does not emphasize these observations about the morality of what was done.
Rather, it tries to present the evidence. But for those who study the issue or read between
the lines, this readiness to harm is omnipresent.391
In light of the massive efforts which the AEC undertook to prevent full disclosure of the
nature of the effects of fallout, it is not surprising that there was such limited public opposition to
its activities. There is enough evidence to suggest that there was some awareness among
Washingtonians that government officials were not entirely truthful, yet, most of the local
population remained largely supportive of the AEC’s activities. Washingtonians had their own
ideas about how best to prosper in their southwestern desert environment, and they developed
correlative economic agendas pertaining to the AEC and its experiments that incentivized their
reluctance to protest with much fervor.
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SILENCE DOWNWIND: THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESTRUCTIVE LAND USE, FEDERAL
LARGESSE, AND PUBLIC ACQUIESENCE
“Our grandsires freed this virgin continent, plowed it from east to west, and gave it to us. This
land is for us and for our children to make richer and more fruitful.... Our rules are nature’s
rules, the laws of God. We command the magic of the seasons and the miracles of science,
because we obey nature’s rules.... We work with brains. We toil with muscles of steel, fed by the
fires of lightning and by oils from the inner earth. We are partners with the laboratory, with the
factory, and with all the people. We provide industry with ever-renewable raw materials from
the inexhaustible world of plants.... We have proven a new pattern of abundance.”392
Underlying the public’s acceptance of a continental nuclear weapons test site was a
cultural philosophy of the proper use of “worthless” land. A cultural imperative which had
existed from the nation’s founding dictated that land and natural resources should be exploited
for the benefit of industrial progress. The desert environment of the U. S. southwest, particularly
in southern Nevada and Utah, contained immense mineral deposits, provided a great deal of
sparsely populated land, and, as of 1941 when the United States entered World War II, had yet to
see substantial economic development. In 1952, Nevada Governor Charles Hinton Russell
stated, “It’s exciting to think that the sub-marginal land of the proving ground is furthering
science and helping national defense. We had long ago written off that terrain as wasteland, and
today it’s blooming with atoms.”393 His statement epitomizes contemporary attitudes many
Americans held about the utility which the natural environment of the Southwest provided: it
was a “wasteland” of “sub-marginal” real estate, and the prevailing idea was that there was
simply nothing there. However, there were numerous ventures in which Washingtonians and
their governmental representatives were involved, and it seems that the promise of local
economic prosperity played a significant role in minimizing the degree to which these people
were willing to voice publicly their concerns with regard to the activities at the nearby nuclear
testing facility.
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There was a distinct narrative in American culture during this period which promoted
industrial advances as both the means for human progress and the means by which a communist
takeover of the world might be averted. Politicians, media outlets, and federal agencies all were
complicit in propagandizing the issue and enabling industrial ventures to exploit barren and
underutilized land in pursuit of a better life for Americans. A 1961 WCN article promoted the
use of chemical preservatives in food supplies, stating that “our U.S. Department of Agriculture
and our Food and Drug Administration are still cooperating to keep our food supply the cleanest,
the safest and most wholesome in the world today.”394 One week before the 1962 election, the
WCN printed an advertisement for Republican pundits that lauded the economic prosperity
resulting from fourteen years of Republican control of state affairs and promised further
prosperity: “Dixie stands on the threshold of a new era with its prospects for industry and
projects featuring our winter climate.... We live in an amazing period of change and progress.
We want to keep in step with the times.”395
During the atmospheric testing period, prevailing public opinion held that private
enterprise offered the optimal prescription for public land use. Shortly after President Dwight
David Eisenhower appointed Oregon politician James Douglas McKay as Secretary of the
Interior in 1953, Utah Representative William Dawson wrote to encourage him to support
economic and commercial development of public lands in the West. Dawson asserted that
previous Interior Secretaries had declared sizeable sections of public land in the West
unavailable for private development.396 Dawson firmly supported opening these areas to such
activity, as “both the Federal Government and the states are losing the opportunity of receiving
the benefits of any metal or mineral resources that could be discovered and developed if the land
394
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were open to entry.”397 Dawson seemed to believe that the influence of lawyers from eastern
states was having a detrimental effect on an audit of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM),
and claimed that since “some 95% of the department’s business deals with the Western States,”
the challenges facing the BLM “would be better understood by attorneys who are familiar with
some of these problems first hand.”398 Essentially, Dawson believed these eastern pundits held
higher regard for preserving western lands in pristine conditions for eastern tourists, rather than
considering the impact of restrictive economic policies on local communities. He told one of his
constituents that while he took pride in the results of his efforts at “preserving our scenic and
wilderness areas” in the West, he believed there were certain “extreme proposals... [which] could
be very damaging to our economy.”399
Nora Lyman used her WCN column to outline her attitude toward economic progress in
western lands, claiming that the dam being built at Glen Canyon near the Utah border in Arizona,
despite its distance from the area, would “bring untold revenue from many sources.”400
Furthermore, she rightly recognized that the “search for minerals and oil is fast proving
profitable factors in the local economy, and I predict a real opening throughout the area in these
industries, as well as others allied with them.”401 Still, Lyman did not subscribe to unmitigated
exploitation of the natural environment. In discussing the dichotomy of use and preservation
inherent in the National Park System, she indicated that she believed natural resources in
protected areas could be extracted while maintaining a wilderness character. To Lyman, an
“expanding economy” demanded that human managers ensure that “wilderness contributes its
proper part in meeting those [economic] demands,” and that pristine land should remain
397
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protected only as long as “the useful benefits that flow from its unimpaired natural scene are
sufficient to justify its continuation.”402
Lyman’s opinion of wilderness preservation is representative of mainstream opinion in
the period, and especially of Utah’s politicians. Representative Dawson responded to a letter
from a Californian in 1955 by stating that while the writer’s “attitude of preservation of the
birthright of every American citizen to the enjoyment and use of our lands is praiseworthy,” he
would not support a specific piece of legislation to restrict further resource extraction on public
lands since “I come from a state where mining and exploration for minerals is very important.”403
Furthermore, Dawson argued that “since human nature has not as yet reached an alturistic [sic]
height, precautions must be obtained through legislation channels to keep for all the people of the
present and our future generations these elements of our national inheritance.”404
Representative Sherman Parkinson Lloyd also supported “the proper use of wilderness
areas for full benefit of society.”405 According to Lloyd, the government must guard wilderness
“against excessive lockup of resources which would handicap the economic development of the
west.”406 A month later, Lloyd wrote to a constituent that while he was “not committed to either
side of the controversy, I certainly do recognize the need to preserve some of our land from
commercial exploitation.”407 However, Lloyd declared that he would not support the wilderness
bill being considered at the time, presumably because it would block certain economic and
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industrial developments.408 Lloyd had initially refused to support a bill for an improved highway
through an undeveloped canyon, but stated in a letter to a U. S. Forest Service employee that
“there is absolutely no question in my mind but that the beautiful scenery can be appreciated
more from a safe road than an unsafe road. Furthermore, it can not only be better appreciated,
but the scenery itself is vastly improved when viewed from the improved highway.”409
While Lloyd tended to take a gentler tone, Representative Dawson was scornful in his
appraisals of environmental activists. In a 1953 letter to Secretary McKay, Dawson claimed that
the “‘nature lovers’” who were opposing the construction of a dam at Echo Park in Dinosaur
National Monument “just don’t know what they are talking about.”410 He later intimated to
House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee Chairman Arthur Lewis Miller that
environmentalists were “persons who generally are unfamiliar with the effect of the Dam on the
development of the [Dinosaur National] Monument” and who made opposition arguments
“based upon emotion rather than fact.”411 To refute arguments made by opposition groups,
Dawson included an itemized Fiction v. Fact list in his letter to Miller. He asserted that the
reservoir the dam would create would not cause damage to fossil beds; that a 200-foot deep
reservoir would not “affect the grandeur of the scenery” since the canyon walls were 3,000-feet
high; that “the Dam would substitute still water in the bottom of the scenic canyon areas for
rapids which now can be negotiated only under the guidance of experience river runners and
always with risk to the traveler, and at an expense of time and money out of range of the ordinary
tourist;” and that nearby residents had been assured in 1937, when the boundaries of the
monument were extended, “that the enlargement would not interfere with power and water
408
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projects in the river canyons.”412 To Dawson, the project would provide additional “power and
water resources” to his state, and he believed the construction of a dam at that location would
make “available to the public the beauty of the scenery of this area.”413 Ultimately, politicians
gave up on the Echo Park Dam Project, instead agreeing with activists to relocate the dam to
Glen Canyon near Page, Arizona, as part of the Colorado River Storage Project of 1956.
While Dawson paid a degree of lip-service to environmental preservation concerns, his
work on the dam project and his insistence on the importance of mining ventures to Utah’s
economy revealed his true loyalties. Like other politicians from Utah, he felt that America’s
strength and “national inheritance” were to be found in its mineral wealth and the ability of
corporate interests to access and exploit these natural resources. The Utah Mining Association
(UMA) frequently featured a small advertisement in the WCN (and likely in other community
publications throughout Utah) entitled “Miner Mike says...,” which the association used as a
platform to influence public opinion in favor of various mining ventures. Miner Mike seems to
have been an everyman-type fictional character that worked for the mining industry and was the
mouthpiece for promoting a “sensible” attitude of environmental exploitation. Mike claimed that
his mining job provided “the satisfaction of earning a good living,” while at the same time
“helping to transform what otherwise would be worthless material into metal products, mak[ing]
life easier for others.”414 In one patriotic piece, Mike states that “strong countries produce more,
and the countries that produce more have won the wars they fought against their enemies. That’s
why Utah’s mining industry is going all out for production. We know what our freedom cost...
and we’re going to make sure we keep it.”415
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Following the 1952 election cycle, the UMA seems to have become concerned with the
proposition of tax hikes and wage increases on its operations, as a Miner Mike ad appeared
which claimed that a mine must remain profitable for corporations in order to be a worthwhile
endeavor. The scare-tactic ad stated that “if costs of supplies, labor and taxes get too high, and
profits disappear... no more mine, no more benefits to everyone in Utah. That’s happening right
now in Utah!”416 Mining operations did, in fact, continue to be profitable, and by the mid-1950s
UMA had phased out the “Miner Mike says...” feature, though it continued to run ads. A 1960
advertisement asserted that “mining is the starting point for economic benefits that spread to
every corner of Utah. Mining results in milling, milling calls for smelting, smelting brings
refining and refining attracts fabricating plants. These widening economic circles produce more
jobs, bigger payrolls, growing supply purchases and increasing tax payments.”417
The Kennecott Copper Corporation was one of the largest mining companies operating in
Utah from the 1940s through the 1970s. The Utah Copper Division of Kennecott promoted itself
as “A Good Neighbor Helping to Build a Better Utah,” and purchased a two-page advertisement
in the WCN in February 1952 featuring a picture of the open-pit Bingham Canyon Mine.
According to the ad, the mine had produced more than 11 billion pounds of copper, 621 million
tons of mined and milled ore, and 1.3 billion tons of removed ore and waste by the beginning of
1952.418 Such was the manner in which the Bingham mine had ushered in “a new era in
copper—an era that proved the mine at Bingham was not a worthless piece of Utah’s landscape,
as some experts then believed, but a vast source of vitally needed copper.”419 It claimed that
Utah’s wasteland had actually been at the forefront for the industrialists to develop “a better way
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to obtain copper,” thus ensuring that “the people of Utah live better.”420 Representative Sherman
Lloyd wrote to the Kennecott Copper Corporation’s public relations division to request “a
picture of Kennecott’s open-cut copper mine,” as he was planning on “decorating my office with
significant photos of industry in my District.... Upon receipt, I would have it framed here, and it
would occupy a prominent place in the outer office.”421
While the Kennecott operation and other mining ventures were important for Utah in
general, Washington County’s most important mineral resource in the 1950s and 1960s was
uranium, and the federal government, in the form of the AEC, was the driving force for
detecting, extracting, and manufacturing the metal. Its total control over the processing of
uranium and nuclear weapons resulted in an “artificial mining boom” throughout the West.422
As the Cold War grew more heated during the 1950s, the AEC increased uranium purchases, and
by 1955 the AEC devoted over $52 million per annum on uranium-related manufacture. From
the establishment of the AEC in 1946 until 1971 when “the uranium program ended, the
commission spent $2.9 billion and bought 348 million tons of the ore,” all of which it spent in
the West.423
Silver Reef, located about fifteen miles northeast of St. George, had been a silver mining
town since the 1870s and became a ghost town until uranium was discovered there. Uranium
mining began there in 1951 under the supervision of Frank L. Morgan, a mining operator from
Springville, UT, who offered to consult with any prospectors who brought ore to his
establishment and to help them operate their Geiger counters efficiently in order to promote the
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search for the mineral and expansion of the industry in Washington County.424 By July 1952,
Utah had become home to “three uranium ore processing mills” as well as “two ore buying
stations,” with “a third Utah ore-buying station... scheduled for early operation at Greenriver.”425
The AEC owned two of the three mills. A report cited in the article of the “raw materials
subcommittee of the joint congressional committee on atomic energy,” stated that “here is a great
desert and mountain region essentially without roads or water, but containing many miles of outcrop, which, we are informed, encourages exploration for the development of uranium.”426 In
September 1953, an article appeared which reported that “drilling for uranium opened up in a
new area this week about ten miles east of St. George where gieger [sic] counters show heavy
radioactivity.”427 Since there was no further mention of continuing mining activities at this
location, and given the timing of the report, the “find” may have been the result of residual
radiation from a hot spot deposited as a result of the Simon or Harry Shots a few months earlier.
By the late spring of 1954, Washington County was in the midst of a uranium boom, with
reports of new veins and mining claims appearing almost weekly in the WCN from June through
October. That May, Lyman reported on the importance of uranium mining to Utah in general
and at the nearby Mt. Trumbull area just across the border in Arizona. She also remarked that
“atomic energy commission geologists have been conducting tests on the properties for the past
several weeks, and I predict that if this ‘find’ proves to be as rich as is estimated, roads will be
built in a hurry.”428 A few weeks later, an article reported that two Washingtonians had
announced “that they have the largest deposit of commercial uranium and copper ore ever
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discovered in Washington county [sic].”429 After several more sites near St. George had “been
reported excellent uranium finds,” Lyman reported a rumor she had heard that “the government
is moving in on one of them for some exploratory work.”430 She also exclaimed that she “could
get so excited and begin to do some prospecting myself if the Boss didn’t keep my nose to the
grindstone all the time.”431 She had regained her composure by the following week and offered a
caveat:
Utah is going crazy over uranium. Maybe that’s all right, but while the fever is on, there’s
going to be thousands of people invest [sic] their small savings in pretty certificates which
won’t be worth the match that will some day burn them.... I do not wish to discourage
thoughtful, wise investment or exploration, for if nobody blazed a trail, our resources would
never be developed.432
Despite her admonishment for caution, the following page contained an article which reported
that a local prospecting group had “sold a uranium showing mining claim on lower Kolob
mountain for $9000 to a Salt Lake company,” which announced its intention “to start work and
develop the claim right away.”433 In August, Lyman reported that violence had erupted between
prospectors, and she “wonder[ed] when the big find will develop and the shooting start.”434 Still,
she asserted her “hope [that] somebody strikes it soon with proof,” and stated that the local court
house had more than 100 mining claims filed.435
Despite the pandemonium surrounding uranium prospecting, it seems that none of St.
George’s mining claims ever became large producers, though the speculation of striking upon a
rich vein continued. In October 1954, a WCN article reported that Searchlight Uranium
Company had purchased a large plot of land near Silver Reef, and the AEC had recently “drilled
429
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three test holes on the 32 claims and have tested the property with instruments and report finding
uranium showings.... Indications are that the St. George area will shortly become an active
producer of uranium ore.”436 The same publication contained an ad for a thirty-six page
pamphlet, “Facts you should know about URANIUM,” which Uranium Publishers, Inc., was
offering by mail order for one dollar.437 Two months later, in detailing a new uranium mine
claim, Lyman professed “I sincerely hope that this discovery proves rich, indeed, and opens up
employment for many who are not working in the mines at this time, as well as to remunerate
well those who own the property.”438 The paper never reported a development to this end,
however, and the following June the UMA ran an ad entitled “Uranium—Prosperity Producer,”
which lauded Utah as the “country’s number one producer of uranium.”439 Having abandoned
the “Miner Mike says...” feature and replacing it with the slogan “From the earth comes an
abundant life for all,” the UMA claimed that uranium mining operations alone accounted for
1,500 jobs statewide, and promised that “as production increases, Utahns can look forward to
more jobs and greater prosperity from this youngest member of the mining family.”440
The AEC announced prices and general requirements for uranium prospectors in
November 1957. These included “commercial-type contracts” and bonus payments for “the
prospector and small miner during the early stages of development and mining.”441 The article
claimed that these features had “sustained small marginal operations for considerable periods;
and some of these have developed into profitable mines.”442 By April 1961, the UMA reported
that whereas “total U.S. ore production was 54,000 tons” in 1948, Utah alone had “produced
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1,071,000 tons, containing uranium oxide... valued at approximately $50,000,000” in 1960.443
The ad further claimed that the industry was providing 1,550 jobs “in Utah, with an annual
payroll of $10,000,000. The uranium industry has come of age!”444 This is an interesting
advertisement, since the UMA had featured an ad two years earlier which claimed “Uranium has
been responsible for about 8000 jobs in Utah since 1950,” which presumably included the
tertiary jobs sustained as a result of mining and milling enterprises.445 Still, the taxable property
value of the industry for 1958 was around $29 million.446
Washington County’s economy undoubtedly benefitted from the potential of a major
uranium discovery in the area beyond the actual production of the mines. Local hotels and
motels, restaurants and other food providers, and various other commercial businesses would
have experienced a rise in revenue as a result of prospectors and corporate agents visiting the
region in search of profits. The local population also would have been spending money in the
search for uranium. In addition to providing standard hardware supplies for mining operations,
Nelson Supply Company in St. George regularly advertised Geiger counters from 1953 to 1955.
The earliest example from July 1953 advertised the P. R. I. Geiger counter under the heading,
“Want $10,000?”447 The ad promised a “super-sensitive” device which would render uranium
“deposits... easily detected. Flasher, meter, earphones indicate presence of radioactive material
and estimate quality and quantity of ore right in the field.... Win fortune, fame and lifetime
security!”448
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In a similar ad in October 1954, the heading had been changed to “Discover URANIUM”
and the promise of winning “fortune, fame and lifetime security” had been omitted.449 A “New,
Improved Model” was featured in March 1955, claiming that it was “the uranium prospecting
Instrument you’ve been asking for.”450 Apparently, local prospectors did not use the devices
solely for prospecting, as the AEC reported in 1955 that since Geiger counters “register only as
high as 20 milliroentgens per hour... [they] can go completely off-scale in fall-out which is far
from hazardous.”451 The commission assured the downwinders that despite any strange readings
they may receive from their devices, “if the fall-out is heavy enough to be of any significance,
our monitors will be in the area and tell you what is happening.”452 There is no doubt that AEC
officials utilized the frenzy of Washingtonians to find large uranium deposits using Geiger
counters to dismiss instances of radioactive hot spots and allay public fears.
Aside from AEC programs and the influx of prospectors, Washington County
experienced economic benefits from other federal sources. In 1951, a group from the University
of Chicago’s Land-Use Planning committee spent six months in the county in order to collect
information which they used “to describe and evaluate the impact of government programs on
the agriculture and rural life of a relatively isolated western community where the pressure of
population on food and other resources is fairly high.”453 By March, the four-member group was
reportedly “enjoying the weather, the scenery, and the people thus far contacted.”454 That
Washington officials and residents counted this group as part of the community is corroborated
in the article, which reported that “this group of new Washington county [sic] citizens are
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looking forward to a happy period of work here.”455 It seems that Washingtonians were quick to
accept outsiders as members of the community, especially when they viewed the immigrants as
productive members of society.
Washington County’s most significant source of non-nuclear-related federal dollars came
from the Hurricane Supersonic Research Site (HSRS). The WCN reported in July 1954 that State
Representative Owen Sanders of Hurricane had received a confirmation letter from Senator
Wallace Bennett that the Air Force would construct a testing facility on Lower Smith Mesa
between Hurricane and Virgin City, Utah. Bennett’s letter indicated that “‘between 20 and 40
men will be used in operation’” of a high-speed track to “test air force ejection equipment.”456
The objective of the facility was to launch fighter jet ejection seats “at supersonic speeds along
the track and then... hurtled into space from a 1500-foot mesa.”457 The facility, originally named
Supersonic Military Air Research Track at Hurricane Mesa, was designed, constructed, and
operated by Coleman Engineering Company, which had submitted the low bid of
$1,023,616.50.458 Coleman Engineering completed the project and conducted the first
experiment on July 8, 1955, and at the height of its use as many as five aerospace corporations
were experimenting at the facility at the same time.459 From the first test through August 14,
1958, companies had conducted more than 150 trials at HSRS while discovering ways in which
to solve the problems associated with ejections from jet-propelled aircraft, which was “a vital
part of the national defense program.”460
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The HSRS was also a vital part of Washington County’s economy. Coleman Engineering
reported that, in 1960, it had “employed 67 persons full time, in addition to 3,939 man days
which temporary employees, most of whom were local people, worked;” this resulted in
“$400,000 in payroll checks annually.”461 Coleman also reported buying “more than $200,000
worth of goods and services on the local market and paid $50,000 for its utilities.”462
Additionally, an internal company estimate found that its staff “annually spent $90,000 for food,
$50,000 for clothing and household necessities, $30,000 for utilities, $50,000 for car expenses,
and additional amounts for medical care, entertainment, new cars, furniture, and other items.”463
The facility did not last long, however, as the base had closed by December 1961, although there
were efforts in 1963 to restore it. Stanley Aviation Company took control of the facility in July
1963 with intentions to “revive the rocket sled testing site employing between 12 and 100
persons.”464 Representative Lloyd wrote to Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara in
August 1963, supporting the Dixie Project “as an aid to our defense effort through improvement
of the Hurricane Supersonic Test Track.”465 Lloyd also told McNamara that “I am anxious to
have the project approved as a means of improving the economy of the area.”466
In addition to the AEC’s uranium program and the HSRS project, the Civil Defense
Administration and other military and AEC programs helped to account for Washington
County’s share of over $100 billion Congress allocated for military projects in the western
United States from 1946 to 1973.467 In 1953, the AEC established one of six new
microbarographic research stations at St. George as part of a project “to study the effects of
461
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meteorological conditions on blast phenomena to make possible the prediction of where the blast
[from NTS shots] might strike and what its strength might be.”468 The USAF opened a Strategic
Air Command Radar Bomb Scoring location in St. George in 1963. Initial reports indicated
“that military personnel of the unit would be made up of four commissioned officers together
with 50 to 70 Air Force Technicians of varied uncommissioned [sic] military ranks [whose]
families will add more than 100 children of school age to our community.”469 St. George’s
Chamber of Commerce estimated “that the new payroll will add some $25,000 to $30,000
monthly to the purchasing power of our community.”470 The Bomb Scoring group began
“electronically tracking bombers” in October 1963.471 Major J. H. Zuidema issued a statement in
which he claimed that “our 75 military people and their families will live in town; their children
will attend the local schools, go to the local doctors and dentists and, in general, become an
integral part of the community.”472 With these substantial economic factors weighed into the
equation, it would have been extremely costly for Washingtonians to protest in large numbers
against the activities of the Atomic Energy Commission at the Nevada Test Site.
Nationally, there were blossoming peace and environmental movements which preached
“there is not peace—real peace—while more than half of our federal budget goes in an armament
race... and the earth’s atmosphere is contaminated from week to week by exploding hydrogen
bombs.”473 However, Utahns in general, and Washingtonians specifically, clung to a divine
mandate for human progress: “Day by day since time began, God sees the steady gain of
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man.”474 In an editorial column which frequently appeared in the WCN and featured various
authors, George Peck outlined his criteria for “sound ethical religion,” among which was the
necessity for humanity to acknowledge
God as the supreme being, the author of life and creator of all things—of God to whom man
is accountable for the constructive or destructive use of his life—of God with whom he
finally hopes to be united in Eternity as a reward for making the proper use of his life—of
God from whom he may be forever separated as punishment for failure to properly exploit
his opportunities.475
For Washingtonians, economic prosperity followed from adherence to the divine plan for human
progress. It would be unthinkable for these people to question the scientific progress the AEC
was achieving at NTS publicly, and it would be questioning God’s providence to refuse the
economic benefits that progress rendered.
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LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF THE BOMBS
“The greatest irony of our atmospheric nuclear testing program is that the only victims of the
United States nuclear arms since World War II have been our own people.”476
Following Japan’s capitulation in August 1945 to end World War II, the U. S.
government began gathering data and analyzing the effects of radiation released by atomic
weapons. Eventually establishing the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, the federal
government continued to study chemical and biological changes in the natural environment’s
flora and fauna while it conceived and developed more powerful weapons and stockpiled a large
nuclear arsenal. After testing began at the Nevada Test Site in 1951, residents of Washington
County largely remained patriotic in their support of the government’s national security
programs. However, a series of mishaps and the public’s perception of strange weather patterns
led these people to question the impact of the experiments on their local environment. The
AEC’s public relations specialists and Utah’s federal and state politicians worked feverishly to
quell Washingtonians’ fears, and the economic impact of primary and secondary industries
helped to alleviate any residual complaints of the citizenry.
The U. S., U. K., and U. S. S. R., signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, at Moscow on August 5, 1963, thus effectively
ending atmospheric experiments by countries which possessed nuclear weapons technology. The
treaty proclaimed the existence of a mutual understanding among the powers to work toward
“the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.”477 This did not
completely eliminate the practice of experimenting with weapons, however. The signatories
476
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simply moved further experiments underground until 1992, when the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty forced all future tests in the U. S. to be conducted by computer simulations.478
The Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) replaced the AEC in
1975, and produced a report in 1977 on the environmental impact of nuclear weapons tests at
NTS. At the beginning of this report, the ERDA vowed that operations at NTS would “continue
to include a variety of both nuclear and nonnuclear projects and experiments… [that] take
advantage of the facilities available, the climate, the remoteness, and the controlled access.”479
The administration believed that “the probable impact on the environment” from underground
nuclear tests would be “small in comparison” to atmospheric detonations.480 Subterranean tests
created radioactive cavities underground, but officials anticipated that all radioactivity would be
contained underground. The report claimed that “since 1971, the nuclear testing program has
maintained a satisfactory degree of competency and consistency for containing radioactivity
underground both during and following the nuclear detonations.”481 It then listed the last two
cases when leaks were detected, both of which preceded the report by seven years or less.482
This seemed to be an admission that, if the program was indeed consistent, there would be future
leaks.
More than 100,000 civilians resided in areas which fallout clouds from NTS traversed,
and the tests (including those conducted at the Pacific Proving Ground) also contaminated
around 205,000 military personnel.483 A 1997 investigation conducted by the National Cancer
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Institute reiterated that a danger of contracting thyroid cancer existed as a result of exposure to
radioactive fallout from atmospheric detonations of nuclear weapons.484 The remaining
survivors and many of their families, friends, and community members affected by the
experiments at NTS have joined to become a voice of opposition to nuclear experiments and
enterprises in the American West.
On March 30, 2006, the Pentagon issued a press release that announced plans for
Operation DIVINE STRAKE, which was to be conducted at the Nevada Test Site in June of that
year. The operation derived its name from “divine”—in this sense meaning “altogether excellent
or admirable; godlike”—and “strake,” which is “planking along the side of a boat…for
controlling” the flow of water around the vessel. The stated intention of the operation was to
further the development of “so-called bunker-buster weapons” in order to allow for greater
accuracy in forecasting the effectiveness of such weapons “against granite, hard structures.”485
The experiment was to consist of one, non-nuclear, 700-ton, fuel oil and ammonium nitrate
bomb.486 The spokesperson’s comment that “‘it is the first time in Nevada that you’ll see a
mushroom cloud…since we [the Department of Energy] stopped testing [atmospheric] nuclear
weapons” in 1963, exacerbated concerns that the explosion would create a mushroom cloud
extending 10,000 feet above the earth’s surface. The public outcry was enormous, with large
public gatherings in cities and towns in Nevada, Utah, and Idaho to protest the proposed test.
Why would the testing of a non-nuclear weapon on lands designated as a military
installation invoke such ire in the surrounding population? The residents’ prior experience with
the government’s nuclear weapons establishment is the only explanation. These people were
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well aware that experiments conducted within the borders of Western military installations did
not always produce results which remained within those borders. Furthermore, information
included in a flyer distributed by protest activists claimed that DIVINE STRAKE was only the
beginning of a larger DOE effort to overhaul the U. S. nuclear weapons complex. Representative
James David Matheson (2nd District, Utah), in an April 2006 letter to Dr. James A. Tegnelia, the
director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), stated:
You are well aware that at 700 tons… this demonstration will not simulate an actual
conventional bomb because no bomber in the U. S. fleet has the capacity to carry a
weapon of this size. Based on publicly available unclassified information, the 0.6 kt
simulation is much smaller than any nuclear weapon the U. S. currently possesses.
Therefore, in spite of your public assurances… that this test is not part of plans to
develop a new nuclear weapon, I remain greatly concerned that DTRA is in fact working
to assist in the development of a low-yield nuclear weapon.487
If this had been the case, it would have violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968
which the U. S. helped to formulate, as the treaty called for “the cessation of the manufacture of
nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national
arsenals of nuclear weapons.”488
According to Deseret Morning News, “two Utah anti-nuclear activists… [and] members
of the Winnemucca Indian Colony” had filed a lawsuit at the U. S. District Court in Nevada by
mid-April to prevent the execution of the operation. The plaintiffs claimed that the detonation
would “create a 10,000-foot mushroom cloud” that would disperse the radioactive nuclides from
the ground at NTS into the atmosphere and create another health hazard for communities
downwind from the test site.489 While some politicians, such as Utah’s Governor Jon Meade
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Huntsman, Jr., and Representative Matheson, requested the operation be aborted outright, others
simply asked the DOE to provide the citizens of Utah public forums at which they could voice
their concerns.490 The government disputed the claims of the critics, and claimed that “the
explosion will not harm humans or the environment.”491 However, the DTRA announced on
May 26 that it would indefinitely suspend the commencement of the test “until questions about
its safety are answered.”492 At the beginning of August, DTRA Director Tegnelia told Utah
Senator Orrin Grant Hatch that “the agency may opt to move the experiment somewhere else.”493
Hatch remarked that he felt Tegnelia “‘now clearly understands the unique sensitivities that the
people of Utah have regarding this subject,’” but the DTRA was awaiting a new Environmental
Impact Statement.494 It remained unclear whether Tegnelia was concerned about people from
other states.
On December 22, 2006, the DTRA released its environmental assessment. The authors
of the report stated that it “was conducted to support [my emphasis] assessment of potential
impacts.”495 Perhaps this is over-scrutinizing semantics, but the wording is such as to give the
impression that the report was biased from the beginning. The report continued, stating that
DTRA “targeted radionuclides present at the site without regard to source (natural or man-made,
local or distant sources)…. The results from these samples confirmed that” the soils “potentially
affected by the experiment did not contain areas of radioactivity that are” above normal
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background levels.496 Speaking to the Deseret Morning News on December 23, Robert R.
Hager, a “lawyer representing an Indian tribe and people living downwind” with Hager & Hearn
Law Office in Reno, Nevada, said that the government had admitted and “‘issued an apology [in
1990] to downwinder Americans for causing tens of thousands of cancers with the same material
that’s in the soil at the test site…. The downwinders I represent are terrified at the prospect of
history repeating itself…. Yet this government seems committed to this very thing.’”497
The governor’s office held two public hearings in Utah in January 2007, the first of
which occurred in St. George. At that meeting, the mayor of Sprindale declared that if the
experiment held the potential to “affect even one person in the public, this test should be
halted.”498 Paralee Eckman named her two sisters as cancer victims, as well as other friends and
acquaintances from Washington County who she knew personally to have contracted cancer in
the years following the atmospheric testing period.499 Retired physicist and Ivins resident
Raymond Cyr noted that government officials had revised their initial assessment that the
experiment would not disperse radioactive materials to admitting that, in fact, some material
would be dispersed and could potentially make its way downwind.500 Claudia Peterson,
employed at the Dixie Regional Medical Center, asserted that she lost her father, sister, daughter,
father-in-law, and mother-in-law to various cancers, and had several nieces and nephews who
were battling cancer.501 Many more wrenching personal accounts of loss suffered as a result of
NTS atmospheric tests followed, as well as understandable incredulousness at the assertions of
496
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the environmental assessment which claimed that there would be limited or no impact on
surrounding areas.
The DTRA officially announced the permanent cancellation of Operation DIVINE
STRAKE in March 2007, so history will have to wait to repeat itself. The agency finally caved
to public protest over the resumption of large detonations at NTS. There were many different
people protesting for very different reasons, including land disputes, health concerns, and the
fear of advancing nuclear weapons research. The complexity of the world situation prior to and
during World War II created a complex set of circumstances in which the United States was
forced to bring to bear all its available resources. These complexities, in turn, led to the
development of the nuclear military-industrial complex in the deserts of the American West, and
thus the necessity (or, temptation) to conduct experiments of capability. It is true that the tests
harmed thousands of innocent people who are still living (or grieving) the effects of these tests.
At the time, however, they were considered to be necessary to national security. The federal
government still controls many “barren” lands in the western American deserts, although the
legality of this situation has been in question for many years. But, while this persists, and as
long as interests of national security are being threatened by “enemies of democracy,” we have
no guarantee that the national security interests will not outweigh the supremely delicate nature
with which nuclear matters should be handled, no guarantee that a complex history will not
repeat itself.
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